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1.0 SUMMARY
The correlation of increased flight delays with the level of aviation activity is
well recognized. A main contributor to these flight delays has been the
capacity of airports. Though new airport and runway construction would
significantly increase airport capacity, few programs of this type are currently
underway, let alone planned, because of the high cost associated with such
endeavors. Therefore, it is necessary to achieve the most efficient and cost
effective use of existing fixed airport resources through better planning and
control of traffic flows. In fact, during the past few years the FAA has initiated
such an airport capacity program designed to provide additional capacity at
existing airports. Some of the improvements that that program has generated
thus far have been based on new Air Traffic Control procedures, terminal
automation, additional Instrument Landing Systems, improved controller
display aids, and improved utilization of multiple runways/Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) approach procedures.
A useful element to understanding potential operational capacity
enhancements at high demand airports has been the development and use of
an analysis tool called The PLAND_BLUNDER (PLB) Simulation Model. The
objective for building this simulation was to develop a parametric model that
could be used for analysis in determining the minimum safety level of
parallel runway operations for various parameters representing the airplane,
navigation, surveillance, and ATC system performance. This simulation is
useful as: 1) a quick and economical evaluation of existing environments that
are experiencing IMC delays, 2) an efficient way to study and validate
proposed procedure modifications, 3) an aid in evaluating requirements for
new airports or new runways on an old airports, 4) a simple, parametric
investigation of a wide range of issues and approaches, 5) an ability to trade-
off air and ground technology and procedures contributions, and 6) a way of
considering probable blunder mechanisms and range of blunder scenarios.
This study describes the steps of building the simulation and considers the
input parameters, assumptions and limitations, and available outputs.
Validation results and sensitivity analysis are addressed as well as outlining
some IMC and Visual Meteorological Conditions-(VMC) approaches to
parallel runways. Also, present and future applicable technologies (e.g.,
Digital Autoland 9ystems, Traffic Collision and Avoidance System lI,
Enhanced Situational Awareness System, Global Positioning Systems for
Landing, etc.) are assessed and recommendations made.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 BACKGROUND
The steady increase in the number and duration of flight delays has become a major
aviation problem in recent years. One of the primary reasons for this increase has
been the inability of airports to keep pace with traffic growth. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Airline Delay Statistics for total delay per air carrier flights
from 1982 to 1989 (Figure 1) indicate that in 1989 alone about 1,600,000 hours worth
of delay time occurred. Hence, from this data the assumption can be made that 3,000
hours (or the approximate time utilized by an airplane per year) results in 530
airplanes (or 12 percent in the United States - US Air Carrier Hee0 being required to
absorb the delay.
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Forecasts suggest that, in the absence of capacity improvements, delay in the system
will continue to grow (Table 1). In 1988, 21 airports each exceeded 20,000 hours of
airline flight delays. Assuming no improvements in airport capacity are made, 41
airports are forecast to each exceed 20,000 hours of airline flight delays by 1998. With
no improvements in airport and airspace capacity, four airports are forecast to each
exceed 1000,000 hours of airline aircraft delays by 1998 as opposed to one airport in
1988. Likewise, with no capacity improvements, 15 airports are forecast to have
50,000 to 100,000 hours of airline aircraft delays by 1998, as opposed to just five today.
In addition, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG) published a Current
Market Outlook (February 1992) in which it was predicted that the number of US
domestic air carrier flights would increase 50% between 1989 and 2010 (Figure 2).
These factors raise the question of whether this growth can be accommodated by
future capacity improvement plans of US airports?
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Table 1. 1988 Actual and 1998 Forecast Air Carrier Delay Hours [2]
ANNUAL AIRCRAFT DELAY 1988 1998
GREATER THAN 100,000 HOURS ORD ORD, DFW, ATL, DEN
50,000 TO 99,999 HOURS 15 AIRPORTS
20,000 TO 49,999 HOURS
ATL, DFW, LAX, EWR
DEN
15 AIRPORTS 22 AIRPORTS
1.00e+7 -
8.00e+6
AIR
CARRIER
FLIGHTS
6.00e+6
4.00e+6
2.00e+6
, 1
/
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
YEAR
US Domestic Air Carrier FlightFigure 2.
A main contributor to these flight delays has been the capacity of airports. Though
new airport--and runway construction would significantly increase airport capacity,
few programs of this type are currently underway, let alone planned. Improved
procedures and new technology are being studied to maximize the use of existing
fixed airport resources. In addition, initiating some modest changes in airport
geometry would also help in better accommodating traffic. Therefore with regard to
this alternate approach, the FAA has initiated during the past few years an airport
capacity program designed to provide additional capacity at existing airports. Some
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of the improvements include new Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures, terminal
automation, additional instrument landing systems, improved controller display
aids, and improved utilization of multiple runways/Instrument Meterological
Conditions (IMC) approach procedures developed via:
1. Close-spaced Independent Parallel Approaches
2. Close-spaced Dependent Parallel Approaches
3. Independent Non-Parallel Approaches
4. Dependent Non-Parallel Approaches
5. Triple and Quadruple Approaches
6. Improved Longitudinal Separation
7. Flight Management Systems (FMS) Approaches
This study focuses on the latter improvement by addressing the potential for
increasing capacity through the use of independent parallel approaches under IMC.
2.2 HISTORY OF SIMULTANEOUS PARALLEL APPROACHES
The concepts for independent parallel IMC approaches date to the 1950s. The basic
premise is that aircraft can approach parallel runways along parallel Instrument
Landing System (ILS) courses (Figure 3).
RUNWAY # 1
RUNWAY # 2
ILS CENTERLINE # 1 _ (
RUNWAY
SPACING
IF ILS CENTERLINE # 2
Figure 3. Parallel Runway Approaches
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The procedures for parallel approaches have evolved over a long period of time
(paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). When appropriate clearance is given from the
controller, pilots in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) can provide their own
separation visually during a visual approach. In such an environment,
simultaneous independent parallel approaches can be made to runways spaced as
close as 700 ft (centerline to centerline). However, under IMC the controller must
provide radar monitoring to assure separation because of pilot problems with
detection and avoidance during an instrument approach. In this case, simultaneous
independent parallel approaches can be made to runways as close as either 4,300 or
3,400 ft, depending on the ground equipment. There are occasions when
instrument approaches are performed during VMC or marginal VMC. However,
for the purposes of this report, it will be assumed that visual approaches with pilot
visual separation are performed during VMC (VMC parallel approaches) and that
the instrument approaches with radar separation are performed during IMC (IMC
parallel approaches).
2.2.1 SPACING FOR INDEPENDENT PARALLEL IMC APPROACHES
Prior to 1962, J.F. Kennedy and Washington-Dulles airports were the only two
airports operating independent parallel approaches with a 6,200-foot spacing limit.
In the early 1960s the FAA sponsored several studies for developing independent
(simultaneous) parallel IMC approaches requirements which were predicated on the
use of an ILS for lateral navigational guidance. These studies included some field
data collection and theoretical analyses, as well as a field flight test program at
Chicago O'Hare. This latter test was intended to verify the parameters of pilot and
controller performance in the event of a blunder by one aircraft on parallel approach
toward an aircraft on the adjacent approach.
At the conclusion of these studies, independent (simultaneous) parallel IMC
approaches were approved for use with a 5,000-foot spacing limit. This requirement
applied to a number of runway pairs at major airports (Table 2).
However, independent approaches could only be conducted when several
requirements were satisfied: the approaches had to be straight in, turn-on to
localizer had to be separated in altitude by at least 1,000 ft between approach courses,
separate parallel approach controllers had to monitor the approaches once the 1,000-
foot vertical separation was lost inside the point of glide slope intercept, and the
parallel monitor had to have a direct communications channel for immediate access
to the pilot:. The separate parallel monitor controllers insured that if either aircraft
exited a designated Normal Operating Zone (NOZ) and entered the No
Transgression Zone (NTZ), then any threatened aircraft on the other approach
course could be vectored away. The NOZ (Figure 4) was 1,500 ft with a 5,000-foot
spacing and the NTZ was 2,000 ft.
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Table 2. Simultaneous(Independent)Parallel Approaches Approved at 5,000 fl Spacing
Initial Approval
Later Additions
O'Hare 6,510 ft
5,400 ft
Los Angles 5,280 ft
Atlanta 5,450 ft
Miami 5,100 ft
Washington-Oulles 6,500 ft
Dallas 6,300 ft
--r-
o
O
rr
NORMAL
OPERATING
ZONE
(NOZ)
#1
NORMAL
OPERATING
ZONE
(NOZ)
#2
-T-
O
0
n-
o..
o..
o')
Figure 4. Parallel Runway Monitoring Zones
With the advent of wide body commercial jets in the late 1960s, hazards from the
wake vortices created by these larger aircraft were identified. This identification led
to the 3 nmi in-trail IFR separation requirement being increased for some aircraft
pairs (i.e., aircraft in-trail to the same runway and aircraft on parallel approaches to
runways spaced less than 2,500 ft apart). However, with this change came a decrease
in available airport capacity for single runway approaches, as well as a reduction in
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the capability of efficiently utilizing runways spaced less than 2,500 ft apart. These
added problems contained in the initial solution generated the impetus to find ways
of regaining the airport capacity lost because of wake vortex hazards. The FAA
initiated programs to develop systems which would permit reduction of the in-trail
spacing requirements under some or all operating conditions.
An effort to reduce the 5,000-foot minimum runway spacing requirement was stated
as a goal of the Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee in its 1969 Report. The
minimum spacing requirement was reduced to 4,300 ft by the FAA in 1974
following successful data collection and analysis supported by MITRE and Reslab,
Inc. The data collection showed that real-world performance on parallel arrivals
was better than previously estimated. Hence, it was surmised that the same levels
of safety could be achieved without a significant increase in the false-alarm rate at
the reduced runway separation. The principal beneficiaries of this change were the
Los Angeles and Atlanta airports, where reduced runway spacing could be applied to
some special configurations or when a runway was closed. (This evolution of
changes in parallel runway spacing is shown in Figure 5.) MITRE continued to
analyze for further reductions in spacing. A BCAG parallel approach model was
developed at this time which pointed to the need for improved radar surveillance
to support further separation reductions [3].
Although these reductions required advanced equipment (e.g., a high quality,
special purpose radar system), it was assumed that reductions in the minimum
spacing were still feasible if lateral and/or longitudinal separations between aircraft
on the two approaches were adequately maintained.
• ' , ! I J
620OFT
PRIOR TO 1962
JFK, ORD, lAD
, |
4300 FT
i
OCT 1, 1974
ATL, LAX
3400 FT I
=
PRM REPORT 1991
MEMPHIS, RALEIGH-DURHAM
= i | r
I- I1963 , ,5000 FT ORD, LAX, ATL,DCA, DFW ? GOAL
i i
i i
Figure 5. Evolution of Parallel Runway Spacing
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2.2.2 SPACING FOR DEPENDENT PARALLEL APPROACHES
A dependent approach procedure must be employed whenever there is inadequate
runway separation for independent IMC approaches. Prior to 1978, this meant that
arrivals to different runways had to be separated by a minimum of 3 nmi at less
than a 2,500-foot separation with the wake vortex standards (3/4/5/6 nmi) being
applied as though the aircraft were approaching a single runway.
In 1978 the FAA provided for parallel dependent approaches with a 2-nmi diagonal
separation between aircraft on alternating approaches wherever runways were
separated by 3,000 ft or more (Figure 6). With this procedure, aircraft approach
parallel runways on parallel courses, while consecutive aircraft alternate between
the two approaches with normal in-trail separations applying between arrivals to
the same runway.
This separation permits easier handling of blunder situations when compared to the
requirements for independent approaches because it eases controller monitoring
requirements and reduces runway spacing.
RUNWAY # 1
t
RUNWAY
SPACING
,LSCENTERL,NE#1 j'l 
ILS CENTERLINE # 2
_.p_
_' ALONG TRACK SEPARATION "-RUNWAY # 2 _,, -"-
Figure 6. Dependent Parallel Geometry
2.3 CURRENT PARALLEL APPROACH SPACING
Currently, a diagonal separation of 1.5 nmi is required for runways spaced between
2,500 ft and 4,300 ft. When there are any runways spaced below 2,500 ft with a
diagonal separation, then wake vortex considerations apply between the runways
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which limit that runway pair to the arrival spacings of a single IMC arrival runway.
Current US procedures for parallel IMC approaches are briefly summarized in
Table 3.
Table 3. Runway Spacing for IMC Approaches to Parallel Runways Without PRM
Implementation
RUNWAY SPACING
>700-2,500 ft
2,500-4,300 ft
>4,300 ft 2
TYPE OF APPROACH
Single Runway
Dependent Parallel
Independent Parallel
SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS
BETWEEN AIRCRAFT
TO TWO APPROACHES
3, 4, 5, 6, nmi 1
3 nmi
(1.5 nmi diagonal distance)
None
1 Specific value determined by aircraft pair, and governed by wake vortex hazards.
2 Present system allows IMC approach to parallel runways at 4,300 fl or greater spacing, however
Precision Runway Monitor System with new radar and displays enables IMC approach to parallel
runways at 3,400 ft or greater.
2.4 CURRENT RESEARCH ACTIVITIES FOR CAPACITY INCREASE THROUGH
CLOSE-SPACED PARALLEL RUNWAYS
As previously indicated, the current criteria for IMC independent approaches to
parallel runways is that the runways must be separated by 4,300 ft or more. This
standard has been established based on the surveillance rate and accuracy of the
Airport Surveillance Radars (ASR) in conjunction with the capabilities of the
terminal Advanced Radar Tracking System (ARTS).
The FAA has currently completed developing two new radar designs that could
increase the capacity of a dozen airports by about 30% under adverse weather
conditions. The airports targeted for employing these radars are those with parallel
runways that are less than 4,300 ft apart. These radars could also enable other
airports to construct parallel runways with less than a 4,300-foot separation.
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) Program is designed to apply an improved radar
to alleviate delays created during IMC. IMC creates airport slow downs wherein
pilots and controllers cannot maintain visual separation such that they must rely on
radar. The PRM program is intended to provide the radar and display hardware and
associated procedures for controllers and pilots to yield runway acceptance and
departure rates that more closely approximate those in visual conditions. Both a
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status report on the PRM program and a possible implementation timetable are
currently available from the FAA. It has been estimated that when these techniques
are introduced at the 12 airports in the study that total delays of more than 255,000
hours per year could be eliminated [4].
The most critical factor affecting airports when in adverse weather conditions is the
time required in which to detect a potentially dangerous aircraft deviation from the
ILS localizer centerline and take corrective action. Therefore, airports with close
spaced approaches require staggered approaches. This constraint is imposed by the
rotation rate of current ASR antennas that provide an update of aircraft position
only once every 4-5 sec. For independent operations, two or more such updates may
be needed for a controller to spot a potentially hazardous situation. Two evaluated
techniques that could address this problem are:
. Installation of back-to-back antenna dishes on a conventional ASR that can
cut update time in half (less than 2.5 sec). (A demonstration system that has
been built by M1T's Lincoln Laboratory.)
o New electronically scanned radar antenna that can provide aircraft position
updates every .5 sec, or even faster if desired. (An experimental system that has
been developed by Allied-Signal Aerospace Co.)
Both these radars use monopulse techniques to achieve a five-fold increase in the
accuracy for determining aircraft azimuth positions .1 mr versus .5 mr.
Additionally, each radar is outfitted with two large 20x20 in, high-resolution color
displays to enable each of the two controllers to monitor positions of aircraft during
final approach. The display shows a 2,000-foot wide "No Transgression Zone" in red
and aircraft "blips" carry alphanumeric identity tags. Each radar has a special
computer designed to automatically detect an aircraft deviating from the localizer
centerline at a rate that could cause it to penetrate the NTZ and alert the controller.
2.5 STUDY OBJECTIVE AND GOALS
This requirement analysis will evaluate air and ground system requirements that
would enable further reductions in lateral separations, while maintaining or
improving operational safety, for close-spaced independent arrival operations in the
future. Aircraft navigation and flight technical error are important factors. Hence,
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS); controller; pilot; and airplane
response times as well as other performance issues must be thoroughly examined.
The following is a list of study subtasks that were performed in developing this
report:
Subtask 1 Review earlier Boeing, MITRE, and other industry collision risk
modeling work for applicability to the current effort, and incorporate
findings of PRM effort.
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Subtask2 Review existing simulation models and/or develop new simulation
models. (Any new models developed will be accompanied with
detailed user documentation to be included in the deliverable.)
Subtask 3 Develop an operational analysis of close-spaced VMC. (Compare
the IMC modeling in Subtask 1 with the VMC operations and
include an estimated navigation/pilot/controller VMC
operational performance as well as identify the key performance
areas in which IMC and VMC operations differ.)
Subtask 4. Establish for the final approach segment guidance accuracies by a
parametric model and analysis.
Subtask 5 Examine the alternate technologies available to satisfy the
requirements developed in Subtask 4.
Subtask 6 Examine the benefits of close-spaced arrival operation at US air
carrier airfields. (Identify improved capacity and reduced delays for
the affected airport configurations.)
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3.0 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A/C
ADI
AFDS
AGL
A/P
APP
ARTS
ASR
ATC
ATCT
ATIS
BCAG
CDI
CDTI
CMD
CNS
CPA
CPD
CRT
CWS
deg
DH
EADI
EFIS
ESAS
FAA
FCC
FD
FMS
ft
FTE
GPS
GPSL
HUD
IFR
ILS
IMC
kn
LOC
MCP
MEAN
MHz
mi
MIT
aircraft
Attitude Director Indicator
Autopilot Flight Director System
Above Ground Level
autopilot
approach
Automated Radar Tracking System
Airport Surveillance Radars
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Control Tower
Automated Terminal Information Service
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
Course Deviation Indicator
Cockpit Display Traffic Information
command
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
Closest Point of Approach
Cumulative Probability Distribution
Cathode Ray Tube
Control Wheel Steering
degrees
Decision Height
Electronic Attitude Display Indicator
Electronic Flight Instrument System
Enhanced Situational Awareness System
Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Control Computer
Flight Director
Flight Management System
feet
Flight Technical Error
Global Positioning System
GPS for Landing
Head Up Display
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrument Landing System
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
knots
localizer
Mode Control Panel
average
Mega Hertz
miles
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I2
MLS
mr
nmi
NOZ
NTZ
PLB
PRM
RA
RMS
RNAV
SD
TAE
TCAS
TRACON
UHF
US
VHF
VMC
Microwave Landing System
milliradians
nautical miles
Normal Operating Zone
No Transgression Zone
PLAND_BLUNDER
Precision Runway Monitor
Resolution Advisory
Root Mean Square
Area Navigation
Standard Deviation
seconds
Total Azimuth Error
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
Terminal Radar Approach Control
Ultra High Frequency
United States
Very High Frequency
Visual Meteorological Conditions
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4.0 PARALLEL RUNWAYS APPROACH PROCEDURES AND
REQUIREMENTS
This section outlines procedures and requirements for independent and
dependent Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches to parallel runways
and visual approaches to close-spaced parallel runways.
4.1 INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEMS FUNCTION
A variety of instrument approach procedures have been developed to guide
appropriately equipped aircraft safely to the vicinity of the runway during
IMC. The most precise procedure commonly employed is based on use of the
ILS. The ILS is a system which provides the horizontal and vertical guidance
information required to enable a pilot (or autopilo0 to accurately position an
airplane on a defined approach path to an airport runway. The ILS consists of
two component systems: the localizer which provides the horizontal
guidance that aligns the airplane with the runway, and the glideslope which
provides the vertical guidance that establishes a safe descent angle for the
airplane approach to the runway surface. Furthermore, the ILS equipment
consists of ground and onboard airplane equipment.
4.1.1 ILS GROUND EQUIPMENT
The ILS ground equipment consists of highly directional transmitting systems
for the localizer and glideslope (Figure 7). The localizer transmitter and
antenna array are located at the upwind end of the runway (Figure 7). The
localizer provides lateral course guidance out to a distance of 18 nmi from the
approach end of the runway and to 10 ° on either side of the approach course.
Coverage is provided to 35 ° on either side of the approach course at 10 nmi.
Localizer information is unreliable from 35 ° to 90 ° on either side of the
localizer course. If the ground facility provides a usable localizer back course,
the coverage is the same as the front course. However, the back course signal
is reversed with respect to the front course unless the airplane installation
includes a back course switch that reverses the left/right indicator. The
localizer signal can be disturbed by departing airplanes overflying the
antenna, taxiing airplanes, airplanes parked close to the approach runway, or
airport structures (e.g., blast fences or buildings that reflect some of the
localizer energy).
The glideslope transmitter and antenna are located approximately 1,000 feet
past the approach end of the runway and about 500 feet from the runway
center line (Figure 7). The glideslope provides vertical guidance out to a
distance of 10 nmi either side of approach course center line. The projected
glide path is typically 3 deg above the horizon and 1.4 deg wide (0.7 deg above
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and below the center line). A number of false glideslope courses exist at
multiples of the approach angle (i.e., 6 deg, 9 deg, ...), but these are identified
by reversed indications and/or flags along with the steepness of the descent
angle. The glideslope does not provide back course guidance. The stability of
the glideslope beam can be affected by airplanes ahead on the approach course
or by vehicles and/or moving equipment in front of the approach end of the
runway. At any ILS equipped airport, the localizer and glideslope
transmitters operate on designated pairs: VHF signals of 108.10 to 111.95 MHz
for localizer and UHF signals of 329.30 to 335.00 MI-Iz for glideslope. There are
40 ILS frequency pairs assigned to various ground facilities in a pattern that
minimizes the possibility of receiving two ILS signals at one time. The ILS
ground facility is identified by a three letter coded identification signal
transmitted on the localizer frequency.
Runwa'
7000 ft (typical)
290 to 600 ft from
centerline el
Sited to provide 55
(:t: 5 ft) runway
threshold crossing
height
UHF GLIDE SLOPE TRANSMITTER
Provides vertical guidance
3000 to 6000
from threshold
-Figure 7.
LOCALIZER
Provides horizontal guidance
ft typical
ILS
FAA INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM
STANDARD CHARACTERISTICS AND TERMINOLOGY
ILS charts should be consulted
to obtain variations of individual systems.
section,
runway and glideslope
extended
MARKER
Indicates decision height point
Locator modulation
frequency
MARKER
Provides final approach
fix for nonprecision
approach
' Glide slope
modulation frequency
\
-/Outer marker located 4 to 7 miles
from end of runway, where glide
slope intersects the procedure turn
(minimum holding) altitude, +
vertically
Approximately 1.4-deg width
(lull-scale limits)
0.7 deg
3 dog above
horizontal -._
(optimum)
width varies:
between 3 and 8 deg,
tailored to provide
700 It at threshold
(fuji-scale limits)
ILS Ground Equipment - Localizer and Glideslope
A typical ILS also includes a third VHF signal that indicates passage of the
outer, middle, and, in some instances, inner markers at published distances
from the runwaythreshold. An approach plate developed by the FAA
describes each instrument approach to a given runway.
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4..1.2ILS ONBOARD EQUIPMENT
An aircraft executing an instrument approach is required to have an ILS
receiver that informs the pilot of how accurately the aircraft is following the
prescribed approach course. Three ILS receivers and one control panel are
installed on a typical modern airplane. All receiver operations are identical.
Airborne ILS installations range from the very simple Course Deviation
Indicator (CDI) (which indicate whether the aircraft is left, right, above, or
below the prescribed course) to sophisticated avionics equipment (e.g.,
Electronic Flight Instrument System - EFIS - which couples with Autopilot
Flight Director Systems - AFDS - and FMS to provide automatic flight control
down to Decision Height - DH).
The DH is the altitude (varying from 200 feet above ground level for a Cat I
ILS to ground level for a Cat IIIC ILS) from which the pilot must be able to
visually sight the landing runway. This height primarily depends on both
the sophistication of the installed ILS transmitters and the airborne
equipment. IMC approach procedures require that if the pilot is not able to
spot the runway at the DH, or if the aircraft is so misaligned that the pilot
would not be able to adequately correct before touchdown, then a missed
approach must be executed.
4.1.3 ILS APPROACH PROCEDURES
The ILS approach course runs along a vector extending from the runway
threshold upward at approximately a 3 deg angle relative to the ground. ILS
approach procedures typically require that radar controllers vector aircraft to
intercept the localizer signal (typically 5 to 15 mi from the runway threshold)
after which the pilot is to stabilize the aircraft on the localizer beam prior to
intersecting the outer marker (which is typically located about 5 nmi from
runway threshold) and to proceed with descent when the glideslope signal is
detected.
4.2 INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
The need to reduce the impact of weather on parallel approach operations led
to several studies that examined radar update rate, surveillance accuracy, and
aircraft-performance on parallel approaches. These studies analyzed data
collected from several airports to justify reductions in minimum runway
spacing from 5,000 ft in 1963 to 4,300 ft in 1974.
The surveillance system is a critical element in determining required runway
spacing. The current terminal area system provides an azimuthal accuracy of
about 5 mr and update period of 4 sec (or 5 mr/4 sec). A MITRE Corporation
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study in 1981 that examined the potential benefits of improved surveillance
accuracy and update rate concluded that the minimum runway spacing for
independent parallel approaches could be further reduced [3]. The
conclusions of that study are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Minimum Runway Separation Summary
RMS AZIMUTH
Accuracy (Milliradians)
Update Rate (Seconds)
4,300*
4,000
3,700
3,500
3,400
4,100
3,800
3,600
3,400
3,200
3,800
3,500
3,300
3,100
3,000
0.5
3,600
3,400
3,200
3,000
2,900
" CurrentAirport SurveillanceRadar Performance
Table 4 indicates that an accurate special purpose surveillance system (1 mr/1
s) could support spacing as low as 3,000 ft. Azimuth accuracy together with
update rates were considered the key surveillance parameters.
Generally one of three types of procedures are employed for an ILS approach
to parallel runways during instrument conditions (depending on the distance
between the runways): independent or simultaneous IMC approaches
(standard radar and high update radar) and dependent IMC approaches.
4.2.1 IMC APPROACHES - STANDARD RADAR PROCEDURES
The conditions currently required for conducting simultaneous IMC
approaches in conjunction with existing standard radar are described in
paragraph 5-126 of FAA Order No. 7110.65H [5] as follows:
1. Parallel runways that are at least 4,300 ft apart.
2. Straight-in landings will be made.
3. An operating ILS, radar, two-way radio communication link.
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o Aircraft must be separated by a minimum of 1,000 ft vertically or a
minimum distance of 3 nmi during turn-on to parallel final approaches
until established on their respective localizer courses.
5. Provide the minimum applicable radar separation between aircraft on
the same final course.
. Aircraft established on final approach course are considered separated
from aircraft established on an adjacent parallel final approach course
provided neither aircraft penetrates the NTZ (a 2,000-foot wide NTZ
centered between the two extended runway centerlines).
. Separate monitor controllers, each with transmit/receive and override
capability on the local control frequency, shall ensure aircraft do not
penetrate the depicted NTZ
8. Monitor all approaches regardless of weather.
° When simultaneous IMC approaches are being conducted to parallel
runways, consideration should be given to know factors that may in any
way affect the safety of the instrument approach phase of flight, such as
surface wind direction and velocity, windshear alerts/reports, severe
weather activity, etc. Closely monitor weather activity that could impact
the final approach course. Weather conditions in the vicinity of the final
approach course may dictate a change of approach in use.
During simultaneous IMC approaches to parallel runways the following are
accomplished by the final controller (who vectors the aircraft with a 1,000-foot
altitude buffer to the appropriate ILS course):
1. The pilot has been given and has confirmed the local controller's radio
frequency.
° The pilot has been given and has confirmed ILS runway number, position
from a fix on the localizer course, an altitude to maintain until established
on the localizer course, and the localizer and glideslope frequencies.
o The aircraft has intercepted the final approach course at an angle not
greater than 30 deg.
Two monitor controllers take over the aircraft monitoring after interception
of localizer beam, with one responsible for aircraft on the left runway and the
other responsible for aircraft on the right runway. These controllers share the
radio channel with the local controller in the event of having to
communicate with the aircraft. (The local controller is normally in contact
with the aircraft from the final approach fix to the runway.)
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The monitor controllers use the same ARTS display since they require
interaction with one another. Radar monitoring begins when separation
based on the 1,000-foot altitude separation is lost as the higher aircraft begins
descending on the glideslope. The monitor controllers are then responsible
for keeping their aircraft within their respective NOZ.
Control responsibility routinely remains with the local controller throughout
the approach operation. The monitor controllers only act to ensure
separation, and normally maintain a passive function requiring no
communication with the pilot except during infrequent situations
necessitating warning, advisory, or vectoring action. Judicious use of the
radio frequency is required since the monitor controllers share their
frequency with the local controller.
The radar monitoring will be terminated when one of the following occurs:
1. Visual separation is applied.
2. The aircraft reports the approach lights or runway in sight.
3. The aircraft is 1 mi or less from the runway threshold, if procedurally
required and contained in facility directives
Termination of monitoring the aircraft should not be informed to the pilot.
(Figure 8 shows paragraph 5-126 of FAA Order No. 7110.65H [5].)
4.2.2 INDEPENDENT SIMULTANEOUS ILS APPROACHES - HIGH UPDATE
RADAR PROCEDURES
In February 1991 the final report of Precision Runway Monitor
Demonstration recommended that further reduction in parallel runway
spacing for simultaneous approaches can be made if high update radars were
used. This recommendation was added to paragraph 5-127 of [5] for
simultaneous IMC approaches with high update radar as:
Authorize simultaneous IMC approaches to parallel runways with
centerlines separated by 3,400 to 4,300 feet when precision runway
monitors are utilized with a radar update rate of 2.4 seconds or less.
The rest of requirements are similar to the paragraph 5-126 of [5]. Figure 9
shows paragraph 5-127 of [5].
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5-/26 SIMULTANEOUS ILS/MLS
APPROACHES
TERMINAL
a. When parallel runways are at least 4,300
feet apart, authorize simultaneous ILS, MLS, or
ILS and MLS approaches to parallel runways if:
1. Straight-in landings will be made.
2. ILS, MLS, radar, and appropriate frequencies
are operating normally.
b. Prior to aircraft departing an outer fix, inform
aircraft that simultaneous ILS/MLS approaches are
in use. This information may be provided through
the ATIS.
c. On the initial vector, inform the aircraft of
the ILS/MLS runway number.
Phraseology:
[-L-S RUNWAY (runway number) (left/right).
M-L-S RUNWAY (runway number) (left/right).
d. Clear the aircraft to descend to the appropriate
glideslope/glidepath intercept altitude soon enough
to provide a period of level flight to dissipate
excess speed. Provide at least 1 mile of straight
flight prior to the final approach course intercept.
5-126¢1 Note.uNot applicable to curved and segmented MLS
approaches.
e. Vector the aircraft to intercept the final approach
course at an angle not greater than 30 degrees.
f. Provide a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical
or a minimum of 3 miles radar separation between
aircraft during turn-on to parallel final approach.
Provide the minimum applicable radar separation
between aircraft cn the same final approach course.
5-126f Note.wAircraft established on a final approach course
are separated from aircraft established on an adjacent parallel
final approach course provided neither aircaaft penetrates the
depicted NTZ.
g. When assigning the final heading to intercept
the final approach course, issue the following to
the aircraft:
1. Position from a fix on the localizer course
or the MLS azimuth course.
2. An altitude to maintain until established
on the Iocalizer course or the MLS azimuth course.
5-1267,2 Refertnce._Arrival Instructions. paragraph 5-123,
3. Clearance for the appropriate ILS/MLS run-
way number approach.
Phraseology:
POSITION (number) MILES FROM (fix). TURN (left/right)
HEADING (degrees). MAINTAIN (altitude) UNTIL ESTAB-
LISHED ON THE LOCAJ.3ZER. CLEARED I-L-SRUNWAY
(number) (left/fight) APPROACH.
POSITION (number) MILES FROM (t'Lx). T'URN (left/right)
HEADING (degrees). MAINTAIN (altitude) UNTIL F..STAB-
L/SHED ON THE FINAL APPROACH COURSE. CLEARED
M-L-S RUNWAY (number) (left/right) APPROACH.
h. Monitor all approaches regardless of weather.
Monitor local control frequency to receive any
aircraft transmission. Issue control instructions as
necessary to ensure aircraft do not enter the NTZ.
5---126h Note I:----Separate monitor controllers, each with trans-
mit/receive and override capability on the local comrol fre.
quency, sha}t ensuze aircraft do not penetrate the depicted NTZ.
Facility directives shall delineate responsibility for providing the
minimum applicable longitudinal separation between aircraft on
the same final approach course.
5---126h Note 1.--An N'rz at least 2,000 feet wide is established
equidistant between runway centeriines extended and is depicted
on the monitor display. The primary responsibility for naviga-
tion on the final approach course rests with the pilot. Therefore,
control instructions and information are issuedonly to ensure
separation between aircraft and that aireralt do not penetrate the
NTZ. Pilots are not expected to acknowledge those trans.
missions unless specifically requested to do so.
5-126h Note 3.--For the purposes of ensuring an aircraft does
not penetrate the NTZ, the "aircraft" is considered the center
of the primary radar return for that aircraft. The provisions of
paragraph 5-7I apply also.
1. When aircraft are observed to overshoot
the turn-on or to continue on a track which will
penetrate the NTZ, instruct the aircraft to return
to the correct final approach course immediately.
Phraseology:
YOU HAVE CROSSED THE FINAL APPROACH
COURSE. TURN (left/fight) IMMEDIATELY AND RETURN
TO LOCALIZER/AZIMUTH COURSE,
or
TURN (left/right) IMMEDIATELY HEADING (degrees),
CLIMB AND MAINTAIN (altitude).
2. Instruct aircraft on the adjacent final approach
course to alter course to avoid the deviating aircraft
when an aircraft is observed penetrating the NTZ.
Phraseology:
TURN (righo'left)IMMEDIATELY HEADING (degr_s),
CLIMB AND MAINTAIN (altitude).
3. Terminate radar monitoring when one of
the following occurs:
(a) Visual separation is applied.
(b) The aircraft reports the approach lights
or runway in sight.
(c) The aircraft is 1 mile or less from the
runway threshold, if procedurally required and con-
tained in facility directives.
4. Do not inform the aircraft when radar monitor-
ing is terminated.
5. Do not apply the provisions of paragraph
5-180 for simultaneous ILS, MI.,S, or ILS and
MLS approaches.
i. When simultaneous ILS, MLS, or ILS and
MLS approaches are being conducted to parallel
runways, consideration should be given to known
factors that may in any way affect the safety
of the instrument approach phase of flight, such
as surface wind direction and velocity, windshear
alerts/reports, severe weather activity, etc. Closely
monitor weather activity that could impact the
final approach course. Weather conditions in the
vicinity of the final approach course may dictate
a change of approach in use.
5-126 Refettnce.--Radar Service Termination, paragraph 5-13.
Final Approach Course Intersection, paragraph 5-121.
Figure 8. Paragraph 5-126 of FAA Order No. 7110.65H
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5--127 SIMULTANEOUS ILS/MLS
APPROACHES - HIGH UPDATE RADAR
TERMINAL
a. Authorize simultaneous independent II.,S, MLS,
or ILS and MLS approaches to parallel runways
with centerlines separated by 3,400 to 4,300 feet
when precision runway monitors are utilized with
a radar update rate of 2.4 seconds or less, and:
1. Straight-in landings will be made.
2. ILS, MLS, radar, and appropriate frequencies
are operating normally.
b. Inform aircraft that simultaneous ILS/MLS
approaches are in use prior to aircraft departing
an outer fix. This information may be provided
through the ATIS.
c. Inform the aircraft of the ILS/MLS runway
number on the initial vector.
Phraseology:
I-L-S RUNWAY (runway number) (left/right).
M-L-S RUNWAY (runway number) (left/right).
d. Clear the aircraft to descend to the appropriate
glideslope/glidepath intercept altitude soon enough
to provide a period of level flight to dissipate
excess speed. Provide at least 1 mile of straight
flight prior to the final approach course intercept.
5-127d Note.-- Not applicable to curved and segmented MLS
approaches.
e. Vector the aircraft to intercept the final approach
course at an angle not greater than 30 degrees.
f. Provide a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical
or a minimum of 3 miles radar separation between
aircraft during turn onto parallel final approach.
Provide the minimum applicable radar separation
between aircraft on the same final approach course
5-.127f Note..-- Aircraft established on a final approach course
axe separated from aircraft established on an adjac.cm parallel
final approach course provided neither aircrafi penetrates the
depicted no transgression zone (NT'L).
g. Issue the following to an aircraft when assigning
a final heading to intercept the final approach
course:
1. Position from a fix on the localizer course
or the MLS azimuth course.
2. An altitude to maintain until established
on the localizer course or the MLS azimuth course.
5-12792 Reference.-- Arrival lnstruaions, paragraph 5-123.
3. Clearance for the appropriate ILS/MLS run-
way number approach.
Phraseology:
POS/TION (number) MILES FROM (fix). "I'URN (left/right)
HEADING (degreeS). MAINTAIN (altitude) UNTIL ESTAB-
LISHED ON THE LOCALIZER. CLEARED I-L-S RUNWAy
(number) (left/right) APPROACH.
or
POSITION (number) MII,,F.S FROM (fix). 'I'URN (left/figh 0
HEADING (degrees), MAINTAIN (altitude) UNTIL ESTAB-
LISHED ON THE FINAL APPROACH COURSE. CLEARED
M-L-S RUNWAY (number) (left/right) APPROACH.
h. Monitor all approaches regardless of weather.
Monitor local control frequency to receive any
aircraft transmission. Issue control instructions as
necessary 1o ensure aircraft do not enter the NTZ.
5--127h Not,' I._ Separate monitor controllers, each with trans-
mit/receive and override capability on the local control fre-
quency, shall ensure aircraft do not penetrate the depicled NTZ.
Facility directives shall define the responsibility for providing
the minimum applicable longitudinal separation between aircraft
on the same final approach course.
5.--127h Note 2.-- An N'TZ at least 2,000 feet wide is estab-
lished equidistant between extended runway final approach
course centerlines and shall be depicted on the monitor display.
The primary responsibility for navigation on the final approach
course rests with the pilot. Control instrucaions and information
are issued only to ensure that aircraft do not penetrate the N'I'Z.
Pilots are not expected to acknowledge those transmissions
unless Specifical.ly requested tO do so.
5-127h Not.' 3.-- The aircraft is considered the center of the
digitized target for that aircraft for the purposes of ensuring an
aircraft does not penetrate the NTZ.
1. Instruct the aircraft to return immediately
to the correct final approach course when aircraft
are observed to overshoot the turn-on or continue
on a track which will penetrate the NTZ.
Phrlseology:
YOU HAVE CROSSED THE FINAL APPROACH
COURSE. TURN (left/right) IMMEDIATELY AND RETURN
TO LOCALIZER/AZIMUTH COURSE.
or
TURN (left/fight) AND RETURN TO THE LOCALIZER/
AZIMUTH COURSE.
2. Instruct aircraft on the adjacent final approach
course to alter course to avoid the deviating aircraft
when an aircraft is observed penetrating the NTZ.
Phraseology:
TURN (lift/right) IMMEDIATELY HEADING (degrees),
CLIMB AND MAINTAIN (altitude).
3. Terminate radar monitoring when one of
the following occurs:
(a) Visual separation is applied.
(b) The aircraft reports the approach lights
or runway in sight.
(c) The aircraft has landed or, in the event
of a missed approach, is one-half mile beyond
the departure end of the runway.
4. Do not inform the aircraft when radar monitor-
ing is terminated.
5. Do not apply the provisions of paragraph
5-180 for simultaneous ILS, MLS, or ILS and
MLS approaches.
i. Consideration should be given to known factors
that may in any way affect the safety of the
instrument approach phase of flight when simulta-
neous ILS, MLS, or ILS and MLS approaches
are being conducted to parallel runways. Factors
include but are not limited to wind direction/
velocity, wind-shear alerts/reports, severe weather
activity. Closely monitor weather activity that could
impact the final approach course. Weather conditions
in the vicinity of the final approach course may
dictate a change of the approach in use.
Figure 9. Paragraph 5-127 of FAA Order No. 7110.65H
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4.2.3 DEPENDENT ILS APPROACH PROCEDURES
The IMC procedure in use whenever the runway separation is between 2,500
to 4,300 ft 1 is termed dependent approaches. The requirements to be followed
when conducting dependent parallel ILS, MLS, or ILS and MLS approaches
are:
1. Provide a minimum of a 1,000-foot vertical or a minimum of a 3-mile
radar separation between aircraft during turn on.
2. Provide a minimum of a 3-mile radar separation between aircraft on the
same localizer course and/or MLS azimuth course.
° Provide a minimum of a 2-mile radar separation between successive
aircraft on adjacent localizer/azimuth courses when the following
conditions are met:
a. Runway centerlines are at least 2,500 ft apart.
b. Apply this separation standard only after aircraft are established on the
parallel final approach courses.
c. Straight-in landings will be made.
d. Missed approach procedures do not conflict.
eo Aircraft are informed that approaches to both runways are in use.
(This information may be provided through the Automated Terminal
Information Service - ATIS.)
f° Approach control shall have the interphone capability of
communicating directly with the local controller at locations where
separation responsibility has not been delegated
Figure 10 shows paragraph 5-125 of [5].
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1 3,400 ft for PRM system with high update radar and new displays.
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5-125 PARALLEL ILS/MLS APPROACHES
TERMINAL
When conducting parallel ILS, MLS, or ILS
and MLS approaches:
a. Provide a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical
or a minimum of 3 miles radar separation between
aircraft during turn on.
b. Provide a minimum of 2.5 miles radar separation
between aircraft within 10 miles of the runway
end on the same |ocalizer course and/or MLS
azimuth course and comply with paragraph 5-72f.
c. Provide a minimum of 1.5 miles radar separation
diagonally between successive aircraft on adjacent
localizer/azimuth courses when runway ccntcrlincs
are at least 2,500 feet but no more than 4,300
feet apart.
5-125c Note.--Applying this procedure does not replace the
,reseribed minima in 5-125b.
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Figure S--125[l]
In Figure 5-12511], aircraft 2 is 1.5 miles
from aircraft 1, and aircraft 3 is 1.5 miles or
more from aircraft 2. *The resultant separation
between aircraft 1 and 3 is at least 2.5 miles.
d. Provide a minimum of 2 miles radar separation
diagonally between successive aircraft on adjacent
loealizer/azimuth courses where runway centerlines
are more than 4,300 feet but no more than 9,000
feet apart.
5.-125d Note._Applying this procedure does not replace the
prescribed-minima in 5-125b.
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FigureS--125[2]
In Figure 5-12512], aircraft 2 is 2 miles from
heavy aircraft 1. Aircraft 3 is a small aircraft
and is 6 miles from aircraft 1. *The resultant
separation between aircraft 2 and 3 is 4.2 miles.
e. The following conditions are required when
applying the minimum radar separation on adjacent
localizer/azimuth courses allowed in 5-125c or
5-125d:
1. Apply this separation standard only after
aircraft are established on the parallel final approach
course.
2. Straight-in landings will be made.
3. Missed approach procedures do not conflict.
4. Aircraft are informed that approaches to
both runways are in use. This information may
be provided through the ATIS.
5. Approach control shall have the intcrphone
capability of communicating directly with the local
controller at locations where separation responsibility
has not been delegated to the tower.
5-125¢5 Note.--The interphone capability is an integral part of
this procedure when approach control has the sole separation
responsibility.
5-125¢5 Rcfet'tnce.--Approach Scparatiot_ Responsibility, para-
graph 5-124; Order 7210.3, Authorization for Separation Serv-
ices by Towers, paragraph 2-14.
f. Consideration should be given to known factors
that may in any way affect the safety of the
instrument approach phase of flight, such as surface
wind direclion and velocity, windshear alerts/reports,
severe weather activity, etc. Closely monitor weather
activity that could impact the final approach course.
Weather conditions in the vicinity of the final
approach course may dictate a change of approach
in use.
5-125 Reference.--Final Approach Course Intersection, para-
graph 5-121.
Figure 10. Paragraph 5-125 of FAA Order No. 7110.65H
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4.3 VMC APPROACHES TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
Several airports with close-spaced parallel runways (Seattle-Tacoma, San
Francisco, Los Angles, Chicago O'Hare and St. Louis) were visited to better
understand the operation and procedures of Visual Approaches to parallel
runways. Based on discussions with Tower and Terminal Radar Approach
Control (TRACON) Air Traffic Control personnel at these airports, several
Boeing Flight Operations test pilots and PRM project pilots, and reviewing
the completed questionnaires (Figure 11) from these individuals the
following summary of Visual Approach procedures to parallel runways were
derived:
, In VMC an aircraft can be cleared for a visual approach if it has the runway
in sight or sees another aircraft (i.e., the preceding aircraft) that has the
runway in sight. Additional aircraft can be added to this chain if it can see
the preceding aircraft.
2. No other VMC separation conditions exist for this situation (i.e., there are
no initial lateral or vertical separation criteria that apply for the initial
turn on separation of parallel simultaneous Visual Approaches)
3. The controller expects the aircraft to be separated according to IFR rules
prior to going visual.
4. The first aircraft must see the airport before requesting a visual approach.
(This is not difficult at 10 nmi according to ATC.)
. The Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) may provide separation
suggestions (i.e., speed recommendations) to simultaneous parallel
approaching aircraft. (Both the tower and the two pilots have a vested
interest in maintaining safe separations.)
. Generally, in a simultaneous parallel approach situation, only one
controller has control over the two aircraft. Exceptions to that are, for
instance, simultaneous visual approaches to Seattle-Tacoma and
Boeing Field where a letter of agreement exists that covers responsibilities.
. Approach generally gives the clearance to go visual, or answers the
pilot's request to go visual. Approach will hand arrivals over to the
ATCT at about 10-12 nmi.
8. Longitudinal separation is limited to wake vortex and runway occupancy
considerations in VMC approach/landings.
9. Approach will provide radar vectors for visual approaches.
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VISUAL APPROACHES TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
Air Traffic Controller Questionnaire
1. Where the clearance for visual approach normally issued? How far out?
2. What is the vertical separation at turn-on?
3. Do you normally use radar vectoring to transition to final approach course?
4. What is the longitudinal separation strategy?
5. Is the either aircraft in sight(by the pilot of the other aircraft)?
6. What is standard separation provided by ATC?
7. When two aircraft turn-on to approach, are both flying visual?
8. What is the minimum longitudinal separation before the aircraft stabiliz
on the extended runway centerline?
9. Is there a limit on intercept angle when two aircraft approaching
simultaneously?
10. Does separation depend on type, class and speed of aircraft?
11. Is position and direction of one aircraft communicated to the pilot of the
other aircraft by controller?
12. Does 1st pilot hear the radio communication with the 2nd pilot?
(Two runway two different frequency)
13. Does controller see both aircraft and maintain separation? How often
does controller interject during visual approach?
14. Does pilot scan the behavior of the other aircraft? In what time intervals?
15. Deleted.
16. Does controller instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation?What
instructions does the controller give?
17. If the procedure require turn-on at _15 nm, is it necessary that either
pilot actually see the runway?
18. What does the controller monitor on close spaced Visual approaches?
19. -At what point does he discontinue monitoring?
20. What conditions must be satisfied to clear two aircraft for simultaneous
visual approaches?
Figure 11. Sample of Air Traffic and Pilot Questionnaire
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10. Refer to [5]. (Figure 12 shows paragraph 7.33 of [5]).
It can be concluded from this summary that: 1) the responsibility for
separation of aircraft transfers from the controller to the pilot after a Visual
Approach clearance is issued, and 2) runway separations down to 700 ft are
acceptable as opposed to 3,400 ft during instrument operations with high
radar update rates.
9/16/93 7110.65H
7-33 APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE
RUNWAYS
a. All aircraft must be informed that approaches
are being conducted to parallel/intersecting/converg-
ing runways. This may be accomplished through
use of the AT1S.
b. When conducting visual approaches to multiple
runways, DO NOT PERMIT THE RESPECTIVE
AIRCRAFTS' PRIMARY RADAR RETURNS TO
MERGE UNLESS VISUAL SEPARATION IS
BEING APPLIED.
c. In addition to the requirements in, paragraph
7-10, paragraph 7-30, paragraph 7-31 and, paragraph
7-32, the following conditions app!y to visual
approaches being conducted simultaneously to par-
allel, intersecting, and converging runways, as appro-
priate:
1. Parallel runways separated by less than 2,500
feet. Unless standard separation is provided by
ATC, an aircraft must report sighting a preceding
aircraft making an approach (instrument or visual)
to the adjacent parallel runway. When an aircraft
reports another aircraft in sight on the adjacent
final approach course and visual separation is applied,
controllers must advise the succeeding aircraft to
maintain visual separation. DO NOT PERMIT A
HEAVY AIRCRAFT TO OVERTAKE ANOTHER
AIRCRAFT. DO NOT PERMIT A LARGE AIR-
CRAFT TO OVERTAKE A SMALL AIRCRAFT.
2. Parallel runways separated by at least 2,500
feet, but less than 4,300 feet.
(a) Standard separation is provided until the
aircraft are established on a heading which will
intercept the extended centerline of the runway
at an angle not greater than 30 degrees, and
each aircraft has been issued and the pilot has
acknowledged receipt of the visual approach clear-
ance.
7-.33c2(aL.Note.--Tbe intent of the 30 degree intercept angle is
to reduce the potential for overshoots of the final and preclude
side-by-side operationswith one or both aircraft in a "belly-up"
configuration during the turn. Aircraft performance, speed, and
the number of degrees of the turn to the final are factors to be
considered by the controller when veCtoring aircraft to parallel
runways.
(b) Visual approaches may be conducted to
one runway while visual or instrument approaches
are conducted simultaneously to the other runway,
provided the conditions of subparagraph 7-33c2(a)
are met.
(c) When the provisions of subparagraphs
7-33c2(a) and (b) are met, it is not necessary
to apply any other type of separation with aircraft
on the adjacent final approach course.
3. Parallel runways separated by 4,300 feet
or more.
(a) Visual approaches may be conducted
simultaneously, provided standard separation is main-
tained until aircraft has been issued and the pilot
acknowledges receipt of the visual approach clear-
ance.
(b) Visual approaches may be conducted to
one runway while instrument approaches are con-
ducted simultaneously to the other runway, provided
separation is maintained until the aircraft conducting
the visual approach has been issued and the pilot
acknowledges the visual approach clearance.
(c) When the provisions of subparagraphs
7-33c3(a) and Co) are met it is not necessary
to apply any other type of separation with aircraft
on the adjacent final approach course.
4. Intersecting and converging runways. Visual
approaches may be conducted simultaneously with
visual or instrument approaches to another runway,
provided standard separation is maintained until
the aircraft conducting the visual approach have
been issued and the pilot has acknowledged receipt
of the visual approach clearance.
7-33c4 Note.--Althoughsimultaneousapproachesmay beCon-
duCtedto intersecting runways, staggered approachesmay be
ne.c_ssary to meet the airportseparation requirementsspecified
in, paragraph 3--123.
7.-.33 Reference..----Char_ed Visual Flight Procedures (CVFP).
USA/USAF/USN Not Applicable, paragraph 7-M.. Separation.
paragraph 7-92.
Figure 12. Paragraph 7-33 of FAA Order No. 7110.65H
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4.4 AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR APPROACH AND LANDING
4.4.1 FUNCTION
The main element of automatic flight controls system is the Flight Control
Computer (FCC). The FCC has evolved from a simple gyro stabilized control
system to the sophisticated multifunctional system currently found in jet
pome_ed _ax_i:_.
The automatic pilot began as a device for reducing the pilot work/oad (i.e., the
autopilot and the system would maintain the airplane attitude while the pilot
tended to other things). The next evolution of the automatic pilot was the
addition of pitch and roll knobs to provide inputs of the pilot to adjust the
stabilized attitude. After this development, the functions of holding an
altitude at system engagement and the capability of maintaining an engaged
heading were entrusted to the autopilot. Further developments of the
automatic pilot included the development of air data computers which takes
sensor data and calculates several essential parameters for the autopilot (e.g.,
altitude, Mach No., and true airspeed), and the installation of ground based
navigation which spurred the development of additional directional control
modes.
As the popularity of air travel increased and emphasis on schedule regularity
grew, instrument landing systems were developed to provide the pilot with
guidance to the runway when weather conditions did not permit a visual
approach to landing. The autopilot was subsequently coupled to the ILS. The
natural extension was to continue this coupled approach to automatically
land the airplane at its destination regardless of the weather conditions.
Fully automatic landing (autoland) systems were demonstrated in the early
1960s, but routine use of these systems in poor weather conditions did not
emerge until the mid 1970s. The main reason for this was the large initial
investment in equipment (redundant, high-integrity systems are required to
ensure safety) and the high cost of ownership (training and maintenance costs
were high). However, the advent of micro-circuit technology provided
improvements in packaging and reliability, as well as a reduction in power
requirements that not only lowered producibility and maintenance costs, but
allowed system designers to be more inventive.
The FCCs of the new generation digital autopilots (the older generation were
analog - e.g., B727, B737-100 and -200, B747-100 and -200, and etc) consist of an
integrated autopilot and Flight Director (F/D) system. The autopilot controls
the aircraft through hydraulic servos connected to the primary control
surfaces while the F/D provides steering commands to the pilot which are
displayed on primary flight instruments.
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4.4.2 CONTROL MODES
The Autopilot/Flight Director System (AFDS) has implemented a number of
control modes that provide control of the aircraft, or guidance to the pilot, for
the complete flight profile (i.e., takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, and landing).
The control modes of the autopilot and F/D are common with the following
exceptions:
1. Takeoff Mode-F/D only
2. Autoland-Autopilot (A/P) only
Control modes on the 747-400 and all 757/767s common to the autopilot and
F/D consist of:
1. Vertical Speed
2. Flight Level Change
3. Altitude Capture
4. Altitude Hold
5. Heading Select
6. Heading Hold
7. Vertical Navigation
8. Lateral Navigation
9. Localizer
10. Backcourse
11. Approach
The control modes are selected through cockpit mounted Mode Control
Panels (MCPs) which are typically installed under the glareshield and over
the engine instruments. Three autopilot channels are provided for the
747/57/67 airplanes: L (lef0, C (center), and R (right). Only one of these
autopilot channels is engaged during the flight, except for automatic landing.
The autopilot is selected either by pushing the appropriate CMD (command)
push button or by raising the appropriate engage lever.
8'
The autopilots for 737, 757, 767, and 747-400 airplanes have a Control Wheel
Steering (CWS) mode. Sensors are installed in the primary flight controls to
measure the force applied by pilot(s) in the pitch and roll axes. These forces
are converted to elevator and aileron commands to drive the autopilot
servos. When no force is applied to the controls, the autopilot will either
maintain the current pitch and roll attitudes, track or heading, depending
upon the individual airline or system design preference.
There are two F/D switches on the MCP (one for the pilot flying and one for
the pilot not flying) that allow the flight crew to select F/D commands for
display on the Attitude Director Indicator (ADI). While the initial ADIs were
electromechanical devices with a gyro stabilized attitude display used as a
backdrop for the F/D commands, the latest ADIs are Electronic Attitude
Director Indicators (EADI) which consist of a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) display
driven by a computer. This computer generates the attitude display and all of
the other data required by the flight crew.
The F/D commands can be displayed with a cross pointer or in an integrated
cue format. With the cross-pointer, one pointer provides commands in the
pitch axis while the other pointer provides commands in the roll axis.
Whereas with the single cue, the instrument has a single inverted V symbol
to produce commands in both axes. In either case, the pilot needs to keep the
command bars superimposed on the aircraft symbol in order to fly the
required flight path.
The AFDS engaged status (CMD, CWS or F/D) is displayed on the EADI
onboard the 757/767 and 747-400 aircraft. The AFDS modes are selected by
pushing the appropriate pushbutton on the MCP and the AFDS annunciating
successful mode engagement on a cockpit mode annunciator. Onboard the
757/767 and 747-400 aircraft, the AFDS mode annunciations are integrated
into the EADI with the mode annunciations split into pitch axis modes
(armed and operating) and roll axis modes (armed and operating). Some
modes can be armed and subsequently engaged when predetermined criteria
are satisfied. (Examples of modes that are armed prior to engagement are the
glideslope, localizer, flare, and rollout submodes of the approach mode.)
The following are descriptions of the AFDS modes (localizer, backcourse,
approach, and go-around) for autoland as used onboard 757/767 and 747-400
aircraft. (Note: Other aircraft will have similar autoflight modes but their
detailed-operation may be different.)
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4.4.2.1 LOCALIZER MODE
The localizer mode controls the aircraft during capture and tracking of the
localizer beam, and like the other ILS modes, is an armable mode. The mode
is armed by pushing the locaiizer (LOC) pushbutton on the MCP. The AFDS
then measures the aircraft progress with respect to the localizer beam and
transitions to engage the localizer mode at the appropriate point. The control
law, upon engagement, turns the aircraft to acquire the runway heading and
line up with the extended runway centerline. Once on the beam, the control
law tracks the beam centerline down to the runway threshold. (The localizer
mode only provides guidance in the lateral axis with no glideslope signal, i.e.,
automatic landing is not available in this mode.)
4.4.2.2 BACKCOURSE MODE
The backcourse mode is similar to the localizer mode (except that the
transmitter is not available at the far end of the runway), so the backbeam of
the reciprocal runway localizer transmitter is used for guidance. This mode is
selected by pushing the Localizer and Backcourse pushbuttons on the MCP.
Two factors that must be taken into account in the design the backcourse
mode are: 1) the location of the transmitter at the front end of the runway
indicates that the beam cannot be used down to and along the runway as with
a front course approach, and 2) the polarity of the deviation signal is reversed
as the backbeam is being used.
4.4.2.3 APPROACH MODE
The approach mode gives the pilot the capability for full automatic landing
when multiple autopilot channels are selected. Multiple A/P channels are
required to provide sufficient redundancy to ensure a safe landing. An
automatic landing is not allowed with only one autopilot channel selected
nor is the F/D approved for providing landing flare commands.
A typical approach scenario would be:
1. Select approach mode by pushing the approach (APP) button to arm the
localizer and glideslope modes.
2. Localizer mode capture criteria is satisfied and the localizer mode engages.
3. Glideslope mode capture criteria is satisfied and the glideslope mode
engages.
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. The aircraft tracks the localizer and glideslope beams down to
approximately 1,500 ft above ground level (AGL), as measured by the radio
altimeter, at which point the other autopilot channels engage and the
Flare and Rollout submodes arm.
. The aircraft continues to track the localizer and glideslope signals down to
approximately 50 ft AGL at which time the flare mode engages. (The
glideslope signal is unusable below 50 ft.)
, The flare mode controls the aircraft to touchdown approximately 450 ft
past the glideslope transmitter with a vertical sink rate of at approximately
2.5 ft/sec.
. The rollout mode engages at 5 ft AGL to control the aircraft to the localizer
beam using the rudder. (Prior to this point the localizer control has been
through the ailerons.)
. The aircraft nose wheel is lowered to the ground (Nose Let Down) at
touchdown and is held on the ground during the ground roll by
commanding nose down elevator.
The approach mode can be flown on the F/D but is not approved for use
below 100 ft AGL.
The submodes in the multichannel approach which are not annunciated on
the EADI but are always active are runway alignment and engine out
compensation which execute control through the rudder. The rudder servos
engage at rnultichannel autopilot engagement. Should an engine fail at any
time after rudder engagement, the autopilot will apply compensatory rudder
to correct for yaw moment due to asymmetric thrust.
The alignment mode becomes active at 500 ft and is used to introduce a
forward slip in the aircraft in the presence of strong crosswinds. The forward
slip is required to reduce the crab angle at touchdown. The alignment mode
does not take into effect until the crab angle on the approach exceeds 5 deg.
The approach mode with its automatic landing capability typically requires
the most design analysis and test activity. The major design concerns for the
approach mode are:
1. Localizer
ao Capture the localizer beam with minimal overshoot for various
intercept angles and speeds, distances from the runway, and wind
conditions.
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bQ Maintain localizer centerline tracking in the presence of windshears,
beam noise and disturbances (e.g., over-flights, etc.), and engine
failures.
2. Glideslope
a° Capture the glideslope beam smoothly with minimal overshoot for
entries from above and below the beam, various speeds, and various
aircraft configuration changes (e.g., flaps, speedbrakes, gear, etc.).
(Figure 13 shows geometry of approach for localizer and glideslope during ILS
approach.)
Glide slope
Localizer __ Glide slope
Figure 13. Localizer and Glideslope Geometry of ILS Approach
3. Alignment
a. Transition to the slip maneuver should be smooth with the bank angle
limited for pilot acceptance as well as to ensure that there is no
occurrence of a wing tip or an engine contacting the ground.
b. The slip response to windshears and engine failures must be analyzed.
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c. The lateral touchdown performance in the presence of windshears,
steady winds, beam noise, turbulence, etc. must be analyzed.
4. Flare
a, The longitudinal touchdown performance (distance from threshold
and touchdown rate) in the presence of steady winds, windshear,
turbulence, throttle, mismanagement, etc. must be analyzed.
bo The touchdown performance for various airport variables (i.e., airport
altitude, runway slope, approach terrain, glideslope beam angle,
transmitter location, etc.) must be analyzed.
5. Nose Let Down
a° The nose gear should be lowered to the ground smoothly with various
braking conditions and in the presence or lack of ground spoiler
deployment.
6. Rollout
aJ Acquiring and maintaining the runway centerline (actually localizer
beam null) must be analyzed for various runway conditions (e.g., wet,
icy, etc.), asymmetric braking, and asymmetric reverse engine thrust.
A great deal of analysis and testing has to be completed to obtain regulatory
approval for automatic testing.
4.4.2.4 GO-AROUND MODE
The go-around mode is selected by pushing the palm switches on the engine
power levers and is annunciated on the EADI whenever a missed approach is
necessary. In the longitudinal axis, the go-around mode introduces an initial
rate of climb bias to generate a rotation in the aircraft, and then transitions to
a speed through elevator control for climbout. In the lateral axis, the go-
around mode maintains runway track.
The go-around mode may be engaged any time after flaps are in a landing
configuration. The design considerations for the go-around mode include:
1. Height Loss during Rotation
2. Performance with an Engine Failure
3. Manual vs Automatic Throttle Operation
33
5.0 BENEFITS OF CLOSE-SPACED PARALLEL RUNWAYS
Prior to the introduction of PRM, the separation between parallel runways
was at least 4,300 ft for simultaneous independent IMC approach operations.
The PRM program demonstrated that by using new radar technology and new
displays the parallel runway spacing for IMC operation could be decreased to
3,400 ft. Currently, the FAA goal for spacing between runways is 3,000 ft along
with improving or maintaining the existing safety standards. This goal may
permit an increase of 12-17 arrivals per hour under IMC at qualifying airports.
This section considers which US airports will be effected and what would be
the benefits if the parallel spacing were reduced to approximately 2,500 ft.
5.1 US AIRPORT CANDIDATES FOR INDEPENDENT PARALLEL IMC
APPROACH OPERATIONS
Preliminary analysis indicates that 26 of the top 100 US airports have or plan
to have parallel runways with spacing between 3,000 and 4,300 ft. These
candidate sites could potentially operate independent parallel approaches
with the use of new technology. Figure 14 shows the existing airports with
the parallel runway that may be effected by the new procedures while Figure
15 shows the future plans for the airports with parallel runways that will be
effected by the new procedures.
4000 --
3500--
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(feet)
3000-
2500--
F-IFT. LAUDERDALE
I_]DETROIT
[] RALEI GH-DURHAM
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[]JFK
[]DALLAS LOVE
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* More than one parallel runway
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Figure I4. Airports With Existing Parallel Runways
4000 -
3500--
CENTERLINE
SEPARATION
(feet)
3000--
2500 --
Figure 15.
(_)BALTIMORE O CHARLOTTE. O HOUSTON (_)WASHINGTON-DULLES
(_) NASHVILLE _) SAN FRANCISCO
(_) NEW DENVER
_) DETROIT 0 SEATTLE-TACOMA
* More than one parallel runway
Airports Planning for Future Parallel Runways
In addition, combinations of independent IMC parallel operations and
dependent IFR parallel operations could be used at some airports to
implement a system involving triple IMC arrival streams with multiple
departure streams. The primary recipients of this concept would be those
airports having independent IMC arrival streams to parallel runways (using
either the 4,300-foot runway separation standard or proposed new
independent parallel approach standards). For such airports, a third parallel
runway, or a favorably located non-parallel runway, may be used for a third
arrival stream. If triple operations were to be permitted in IMC, then airports
could achieve up to a 50 percent increase in capacity. Preliminary analysis
indicates that, of the top 100 airports, 14 are possible candidates for triple IFR
approaches (Table 5).
5.2 CAPACITY SIMULATION PROGRAM
In order-to evaluate the benefits of close-spaced parallel runways a simulation
program called Capacity-Delay that has been developed by Avionics Flight
Systems/ATC Research System Analysis organization of BCAG will be used.
Capacity-Delay is a fast time computer program that simulates arrival and
departure operations of airport runways for estimating average delays and
airfield operation capacity. The program determines airport capacity and delay
as a function of:
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Table 5. Candidates for Triple IMC Approaches
Potential Annual Delay Savings of Over 1,000 Hours +
Atlanta ATL"
Chicago ORD
Dallas-Ft. Worth DFW""
Washington IAD
Detroit DTW"
Pittsburgh PIT*
Raleigh-Durham RDU"
Salt Lake City SLC"
Orlando MCO"
Other Candidates
Cincinnati CVG"
Houston IAH"
Tulsa TUL °
Charlotte CLT
Denver (New DVX)
+ 1989 - 1995 Demand Levels.
* The procedure is applicable upon construction of a planned new runway.
** Upon implementation of Triple Parallel Approaches.
1. Airport Configuration
2. Traffic Characteristics
3. Aircraft Performance Parameters
4. Separation Minimums
5. Runway Configurations
6. ATC Performance Parameters
An input data file must exist before the simulation can begin. The input data
is grouped into six categories:
1. Program Control Parameters (e.g., number of Monte-Carlo samples,
number of data sets, samples per traffic level, etc.)
. Airport Configuration Data (e.g., number of runways, runway entrance
speed, runway length, exit locations, maximum exit speed, length of
primary runway, etc.)
3. Traffic Inputs (e.g., percentages of airplane classes in a mix, arrival and
departure mixtures, traffic level, etc.)
4. ATC Performance Parameters (e.g., safety separation probability, outer-
marker location, inter-arrival errors, etc.)
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. Airplane Performance Parameters (e.g., final approach velocities for each
class, initial climb velocities, acceleration and deceleration rates,
maximum exit speed for each class, rolling deceleration, rolling speed, etc.)
6. Flight Separation Rules Between Operations (e.g., interoperational
spacing, longitudinal separation, wake vortex for different classes, etc.).
The capacity simulation selects an operation from the schedule (according to
the operation sequencing rule specified) and then assigns the operation a
runway (according to the runway assignment rule specified) while separating
consecutive operations by the mean interoperational time until the operation
demand is empty. When the demand is empty, statistical means and
standard deviations are calculated to determine the average airplane delay
and averaged rates of operation. Finally the average delay per operation
along with throughput and practical capacities are summarized at the end of
the file.
5.3 ESTIMATION OF BENEFITS DERIVED FROM CAPACITY-DELAY
SIMULATION PROGRAM
Only airports with dual parallel runways will be considered. (Figures 14 and
15 can be summarized in Table 6).
Table 6. Airports with Parallel Runways Affected by New Procedures
RUNWAY SPACING
3,400-4,3OO ft
3,000-3,400 ft
2,500-2,999 ft
FUTURE PLAN
i
2
3
2
EXISTING
6
3
3
An initial evaluation using the Capacity program provides the following
information:
1. IMC parallel runway approaches result in 27% more operations than IFR
dependent parallel runway approaches.
2. VMC approaches result in 48% more operations than IFR dependent
parallel runway approaches.
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3. VMC approaches result in 16% more operations than IMC paraUel runway
approaches.
This data must be utilized together with the weather conditions to obtain the
best estimate of improved capacity.
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6.0 DEVELOPMENT OF A BLUNDER SIMULATION MODEL
A key element toward increasing operational capacity at high-demand
airports is to develop analysis tools for determining a safe runway separation
of independent parallel ILS approaches. A blunder simulation model is one
such tool.
A critical problem of final approach and terminal area air route operations is
maintaining separation between aircraft independtly flying close-proximity
tracks. These operations consist of assigning tracks for the aircraft to fly and
monitoring progress (i.e., determine that the assigned tracks are being
maintained). The control problem is to identify when an aircraft is deviating
from the track and to take corrective action in preventing a collision with
another aircraft. The technical approach used for this study was to begin with
analyzing all final approach factors that might influence achievable
separations (i.e., turn-on, approach tracking, blunder operation, and missed
approach).
6.1 FINAL APPROACH FACTORS
Factors involved in the current 4,300-foot (or proposed PRM 3,400-foot)
separation criteria include: turn-on, normal approaches, blunder, and missed
approach.
6.1.1 TURN-ON FACTORS
The first stage after cruise transition mode is the approach mode or turn-on to
localizer capture. For final approach to parallel runway the parameters
involved are:
1. Vertical Separation (current operations require minimum of 1,000 ft
altitude separation between two aircraft)
2. Final Approach Path Length Requirement
° Overshoot versus capture method
a. Manual Flight
b. Flight Director
c. Analogue Autopilot
d. Digital Autopilot
4. Minimum Localizer Capture Distance
5. Requirements for Close-in Capture
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. Technologies to Permit Close-in Captures
a. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System/Cockpit Display Traffic
Information (TCAS/CDTI)
b. Air/Air Data Link
c. Enhanced Situational Awareness System (ESAS)
d. Global Positioning System/Area Navigation (GPS/RNAV)
e. State of the Art Autopilot
6.1.2 NORMAL APPROACH FACTORS
The approach factors, after aircraft turn-on to parallel runway localizer, to be
analyzed are:
o Lateral Separation (current independent ILS approaches to parallel
runways requires minimum of 4,300 ft - or 3,400 ft using PRM - space
between two runways)
2. Final Approach Probability of Loss of Lateral Separation (CDI, Flight
Director and Analogue or Digital Autopilot tracking performance)
3. Final Approach Probability of NTZ Encounter
6.1.3 BLUNDER FACTORS
Whenever the approach is abnormal, then either a blunder or missed
approach have occurred. In the case of a blunder, some of the reasons for an
aircraft flying into the NTZ and crossing a parallel approach path are:
. Airborne Equipment Failure
a. Aircraft Control Surface Malfunction (e.g., spoiler hardover, spoiler
float and rudder, aileron or flaps failure)
b. Navigation Instrument Failure
c. Engine Failure
d. Aircraft Control Law Logic Failure (e.g., during localizer or glideslope
capture)
e. Power Supply Failure
f. Fire
g. Air Ground Communication Failure
h. Hydraulic Failure
, Ground Equipment Failure and Errors
a. Ground Air Communication Failure
b. Fly Over Antenna
c. Power Failure
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d. Distorted Signals
e. Large Amplitude of Oscillation (due to sensitivity of localizer beam)
3. Human Errors
a. Disorientation (because of failure or warning)
b. Lack of Attention (to hear or see a warning)
c Miss Identification from Controller
d. Dialing Wrong Frequencies/Tracking Wrong Beam
e. Power Failure
f. Misunderstanding of Duties by Pilot Flying and Pilot Not Flying.
The blunder factors to be analyzed are:
1. Data on Frequency and Type of Blunder
2. Current FAA Sponsored Blunder Scenarios
3. Blunder Model Probability of Recovery
a. Communication Delay
b. Surveillance Rate and Accuracy
c Controller/Pilot/Aircraft Response Time
4. Simulation Data on Blunder Recovery
5. Technologies to Support Blunder Recovery
a. TCAS/CDTI
b. Air/Air Data Link
c. ESAS
d. New Color Monitors and Faster Radars
e. GPS/RNAV
6. New ATC Procedures
7. Technologies to Support Blunder Avoidance
6.1.4 MISSED APPROACH FACTORS
If a blunder should occur, then a missed approach is required.
approach factors to be analyzed are:
1. Data on Frequency and Type of Blunder
2. Dual, Triple and Quadruple Missed Approach Operation
The missed
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t.
Missed Approach Probability of Loss of Separation (e.g., navigation
performance, missed approach deviation errors due to Flight Technical
Error (FTE), and other errors)
Technologies to support missed approach (e.g., GPS, TCAS/CDTI, ESAS,
Autopilot, etc.)
6.2 PARAMETRIC SIMULATION MODEL FOR PARALLEL RUNWAY
APPROACHES
Among the four factors discussed in subsection 6.1, only the blunder factor
will be utilized to develop the simulation model. This area is emphasized
because of its recognized criticality to the runway spacing problem. The
objective of building this simulation is to develop a parametric model that
can be used for analyses in determining the minimum safety level of parallel
runway operations for various parameters representing the airplane,
navigation, surveillance, and ATC system performance. The safety criterion is
based on the conditional probability of successfully resolving a blunder given
that one has occurred.
6.2.1 PARAMETRIC MODEL DEVELOPMENT RATIONALE
A study of the existing airport runway geometry and proposed ATC
procedures for ensuring safety must be conducted in order for an airport to
qualify for acceptable simultaneous IMC operation on parallel runways (or to
determine a limit for national standard for parallel runway spacing). Though
this type of qualification process involves extensive and costly flight test data,
there is a growing recognition of the usefulness of a fast time simulation
model to set lateral separation requirements guidelines in the terminal area.
A fast time simulation model can parametrically represent airplane,
navigation, and air traffic control performance and economically investigate a
wide range of what if questions regarding parallel runway operations.
Such a theoretical model of parallel runway operations is useful as:
1. A quick and economical evaluation of existing environments that are
experiencing IMC delays.
2. An efficient way to study and validate proposed procedure modifications
to permit simultaneous operations.
3. A tool to develop a set of general requirements for simultaneous
operations.
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A simple, parametric investigation of a wide range of issues and
approaches.
A measure for determining trade-off of air and ground technology and
procedures contributions.
A tool for outlining probable blunder mechanisms and a range of blunder
scenarios.
6.2.2 FLOW DIAGRAM OF BUILDING PARAMETRIC SIMULATION
MODEL
To accomplish the objectives of building a parametric simulation model the
following steps were followed in the order presented:
1. Environment Specification
2. Model Development
3. Model Exercise and Sensitivity Analysis for IMC and VMC Approach
Operation
4. Documentation
Figure 16 shows the interrelations between these steps and outlines some of
the inputs and outputs.
ENVIRONMENT
SPECIFICATION
MODEL
DEVELOPMENT
• ATC PROCEDURES
• ATC CAPABILITIES
• AIRPLANE POPULATION DATA
• STUDY PAST AND EXISTING MODELS
• ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
• REQUIRED INPUTS
• POSSIBLE OUTPUTS
• CODING
_ MODEL EXERCISE
AND
SENSITIVITY
• TESTING THE MODEL
• VALIDATION
• SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
DOCUMENTATION
AND
FINAL REPORT
Figure 16. Study Flow Diagram
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The environment specification task is a continuing effort of the study that
provides inputs for developing the model and exercising the task. The types
of information required for the task include ATC procedures (i.e., data to be
used in the model development) and a set of airplane characteristics (i.e., data
to be used in developing and exercising the model). The environment
specification and aircraft parameters consist of terminal area environment,
ATC procedures, and aircraft population and class data.
6.2.2.1 TERMINAL AREA APPROACH ENVIRONMENT
The terminal area modeling will consider: the terminal approach control
region, runway spacing, NTZ and NOZ width, aircraft distance from runway
threshold, longitudinal and lateral distance of aircraft, three dimensional
approach path, etc.
6.2.2.2. ATC PROCEDURES
The basic model will use the procedures specified in [5] with variations on the
regulations contained therein being exercised as a requirement in satisfying
the study goals.
6.2.2.3 AIRCRAFT POPULATION DATA
Appropriate parameters of a family of aircraft to be used in the model are
defined here. These parameters are: velocity distributions, maneuver
performance data, response time, and approach characteristics.
. Velocity distributions for descent and approach configurations will be
obtained from the operations manual for the specific airplane. These
velocity distributions will provide the nominal values and deviations to
be considered. While the BCAG family of transports provide a broad
coverage of the weight spectrum, it will be necessary to obtain parameters
for other transports and lighter aircraft.
. Maneuver performance data (i.e., turning radius, bank angle, and normal
accelerations available) are a function of the difference between reference
speect and the speed for stall warning or the onset of buffet. The required
parameters are available from flight test documentation for all BCAG
transports. For other than BCAG aircraft the required parameters will be
estimated by BCAG performance methods whenever test data are not
available.
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° Combined pilot-airplane response times for initiation and completion of
required maneuvers will be obtained via the use of real time simulator
data and available data which has been collected by FAA supported
studies. The flight simulator is capable of determining the effects of speed,
weight, and configuration changes with great accuracy. Also Autopilot
and Autoland System Performance can be utilized for accurate response
characterization of approach maneuvers.
4. The approach and missed approach airplane dynamic performance will be
provided.
6.3 PARAMETRIC BLUNDER SIMULATION MODEL
The simulation program PLAND_BLUNDER (PLB) is designed to study
blunders during landings on parallel runways. A typical scenario of PLB
assumes that two streams of aircraft approaching parallel runways
independently of one another during IMC parallel approaches. If one aircraft
should deviate from its assigned localizer towards the opposite runway, there
could be an endangered (evader) aircraft in its path. A deviation from the
parallel approach towards the opposite runway constitutes a blunder. The
scenario of concern would be one in which the blundering aircraft was unable
to recover (i.e., returning to the assigned approach) and continue toward the
adjacent stream of aircraft.
PLB is a Monte Carlo-type fast simulation of the events and aircraft position
during a blunder situation. This model simulates two aircraft performing
parallel ILS approaches using IMC or VMC procedures with one aircraft
blundering and the other possibly reacting to avoid the blunderer. PLB uses a
simple movement model and control law in three (X, Y, Z) dimensions to
represent the aircraft responses.
6.3.1 INPUT(S) OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
The input parameters include: runway geometry, aircraft class, approach
speed of aircraft, general type of blunder, general type of reaction, near miss
criteria, and number of Monte Carlo cases to run. Some of the randomly
influenced parameters are: initial along-track distance between aircraft, angle
of blun_ler, location of blunder, time to detect blunder, time to react by
controller, time to react by pilot, aircraft response delay, and aircraft class.
Figure 17 shows a sample input file.
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******************* AC TYPE SEGMENT *********************
: Comment: Define aircraft types and fleetmix.
AC TYPE 4 SIZE 230.0 200.0 70.0 Tresponse 3.0 1.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 170.0 i0.0 140.0
>>5 ESC ACEL, CLMB m+SD 30.0 I0.0 40.0 i0.0 TAE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -2.0 5.0
AC TYPE I SIZE 50.0 60.0 30.0 Tresponse 2.0 1.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 110.0 10.0 80.0
>>5 ESC ACEL, CLMB m+SD 30.0 10.0 30.0 10.0 TAE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -3.0 10.0
AC TYPE 2 SIZE 100.0 100.0 50.0 Tresponse 2.0 1.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 140.0 i0.0 110.0
>>5 ESC ACEL, CLMB m+SD 30.0 10.0 40.0 10.0 TAE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -2.0 7.0
AC TYPE 3 SIZE 150.0 160.0 60.0 Tresponse 3.0 1.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 160.0 10.0 130.0
>>5 ESC ACEL, CLMB m+SD 30.0 10.0 40.0 10.0 TAE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -2.0 5.0
FLEETMIX (1-6) I0.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
ALT_FMIX (1-6) 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
******************* PROFILE SEGMENT *********************
! Comment: Define the blunder and escape profiles for the aircraft.
AC CASE BLUNDER 1 AC 1 TYPE 0 RWY L Dstart 70000.0 Tstart m+SD 0.0 0.0
>>_ dTURN _.0 Dblund hi, lo 60761.0 60761.0 BLUND m+SD ANG 30.0 1.0 SLOPE
AC CASE NORM ESC 1 AC 2 TYPE 9 RWY R Dstart 70000.0 Tstart m+SD 0.0 0.0
>>5 BANK--m+SD 60.0 0.0 HEAD 50.0 CLIMB/ACCEL BY TYPE
******************* RUNWAY GEOMETRY SEGMENT *********************
! Cogent : Define runway geometry.
RWY DEF R THRESH 0.0 CENTERLINE, NOZ -2150.0 1150.0
RWY_--DEF L THRESH 0.0 CENTERLINE, NOZ -2150.0 1150.0
******************* RESPONSE TIME SEGMENT *********************
! Comment : Define alarm criteria and response delay times..
ALARM Dalarm 300.0
RESPONSE SENSOR GAUSSIAN 3.0 1.0
RESPONSE ATC DISTR FILE study. O.ATC.dat
RESPONSE COM GAUSS_AN 1.5 0.5
RESPONSE PILOT GAUSSIAN 4.0 1.0
******************* RUNX SEGMENT *********************
! Comment: Define the range of x-offset geometries and the number of runs.
STEP T Tmin, max, step -3.0 3.0 2.0
RUN X 3 SEED 7000000
QuI_
5.0 kts
5.0 kts
5.0 kts
5.8 kts
0.0 1.0 DV 0.0 10.0
Figure 17. Sample Input File
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6.3.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The movement model assumes that the bank and pitch angles are decoupled
and instantaneous while the turns are modeled as constant radius and level.
There is no energy modeling of altitude, speed, and turning. The aircraft is
assumed to follow the nominal profile plan with no minor adjustments to
course, altitude and speed. There is no flight control system to react to
perturbations or changes. The runways are assumed to be exactly parallel and
level. Only the part of the approach after turn-on is modelled. Each run is
terminated 50 sec after the evasion maneuver starts, since it is assumed that
the closest approach will have occurred before then. The aircraft position
update interval is .5 second. A blunder is considered to have occured when
either the alarm distance from the centerline or the edge of the NTZ is
breached by the blunder aircraft. The alarm distant and the NTZ edge are set
equal for IMC runs. The alarm distance defines a blunder for VMC runs.
6.3.3 OUTPUT OF SIMULATION
The standard output of PLB is the probability of successful resolution of a
blunder, once it has occurred. Figure 18 is a sample output file. (Refer to
Volume 2 of this document for a complete description of inputs and outputs.)
LO HI HITSper HITSn HITSper_cum HITSn_cum
0.0 I00.0 0.0087 105 0.0087 105
100.0 200.0 0.0104 126 0.0191 231
200.0 300.0 0.0164 198 0.0355 429
300.0 400.0 0.0226 274 0.0581 703
400.0 500.0 0.0264 320 0.0845 1023
500.0 600.0 0.0305 369 0.1150 1392
600.0 700.0 0.0413 500 0.1564 1892
700.0 800.0 0.0420 508 0.1983 2400
800.0 900.0 0.1526 1847 0.3510 4247
900.0 I000.0 0.0477 577 0.3987 4824
i000.0 ii00.0 0.0349 422 0.4336 5246
Ii00.0 1200.0 0.0360 435 0.4695 5681
1200.0 1300.0 0.0308 373 0.5003 6054
1300.0 1400.0 0.0299 362 0.5302 6416
1400.0 1500.0 0.0336 406 0.5638 6822
1500.0 1600.0 0.0289 350 0.5927 7172
1600.0 1700.0 0.0285 345 0.6212 7517
1700.0 1800.0 0.0292 353 0.6504 7870
1800.0 1900.0 0.0265 321 0.6769 8191
1900.0 2000.0 0.0345 417 0.7114 8608
2000.0 2100.0 0.0292 353 0.7406 8961
2100.0 2200.0 0.0295 357 0.7701 93i8
2200.0 2300.0 0.0279 337 0.7979 9655
2300.0 2400.0 0.0297 359 0.8276 10014
2400.0 2500.0 0.0277 335 0.8553 10349
2500.0 2600.0 0.0283 342 0.8836 10691
2600.0 2700.0 0.0248 300 0.9083 10991
2700.0 2800.0 0.0178 215 0.9261 11206
2800.0 2900.0 0.0151 183 0.9412 11389
2900.0 3000.0 0.0158 191 0.9570 11580
3000.0 3100.0 0.0123 149 0.9693 11729
3100.0 3200.0 0.0130 157 0.9823 11886
3200.0 3300.0 0.0074 90 0.9898 11976
3300.0 3400.0 0.0056 68 0.9954 12044
3400.0 3500.0 0.0027 33 0.9981 12077
3500.0 3600.0 0.0019 23 1.0000 12100
3600.0 3700.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
5700.0 3800.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
3800.0 3900.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
3900.0 4000.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4000.0 4100.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4100.0 4200.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4200.0 4300.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4300.0 4400.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4400.0 4500.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4500.0 4600.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4600.0 4700.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4700.0 4800.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4800.0 4900.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4900.0 5000.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
Figure 18. Sample Output File
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7.0 ANALYSIS OF IMC APPROACH TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
Herein a baseline case for analyzing IMC approach to parallel runways is
outlined and examined. This baseline case is for determining the probability
of the closest point of approach (CPA) for two aircraft (one blundering and the
other evading) as a baseline case. From this baseline then, the sensitivity
analysis results can be investigated and the parameter variations in the
simulation model evaluated.
7.1 BASELINE CASE FOR IMC APPROACH TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
The PLB Model was validated by comparing it to an existing model, the
MITRE Blunder Resolution Model. This comparison resulted in a < 500 ft
CPA for the PLB which was within the expected agreement bound (20%) of
the MITRE model [4] using almost identical inputs. Figure 19 shows this
baseline case representing the IMC approaches to parallel runways. A brief
summary of the parameters and their values are:
runway separation
alarm distance
NTZ width
TAE mean/SD
response time/SD
longitudinal relation
sire blunderer start
nominal speed
blunder angle
blunder turn rate
evader bank angle
evader turn heading
evader climb rate
evader speed increase
evader/blunder fleetmix
4,300 ft
1,150 ft
2,000 ft
-1/3 mr
8.9/9.8 sec
-2,500 to 3,000 ft
blunder at 60,761 to 12,152 ft (from runway threshold)
varies according to aircraft type (refer to input file)
30 deg
3 deg/sec
22 deg
55 deg
varies according to aircraft type (refer to input file)
0
percent of aircraft fleetmix (6 types of aircraft
class) categorized by speed mean and
standard deviation (SD) at far/close distances
from runway threshold
Figure 20 is the output file of the baseline case showing only the data out to a
CPA of-5,000 ft. This table indicates that the probability of an unresolved
blunder (i.e., CPA <500 ft) is about 4% for the baseline conditions. Figure 21
plots the cumulative probability distribution function of the CPA miss-
distance.
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*******t,w********* AC TYPE SEG_MEI4T w********************
! Comment : Define aircraft types and flee*mix.
! Cc_ent: MITRE_type : AC TYPE correlation (1:1 2:2 3:3 4:- 5:- 6:- 7:4 8:5 9:6)
AC_TY_E 1 SIZE I00.0 i00.0 50.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 150.0 1.78 100.0 1.78 kts
>>> ESC ACEL CLM_ m+SD 0.0 0.0 33.0 0.0 rTE A_GLE(mR) _+SD -i.0 3.0
AC_TYPE 2 SIZE 100.0 I00.0 50.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 150.0 1.78 110.0 1.78 kts
>>> ESC ACEL CLMB m÷SD 0.0 0.0 17.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -1.0 3.0
AC TYPE 3 SIZE 100.0 100.0 50.0 T=esponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 150.0 1.78 110.0 1.78 kLs
>>> ESC ACEL CLMB m+SD 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m÷SD -I.0 3.0
AC TYPE 4 SIZE 230.0 200.0 70.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+5D 180,0 1,78 140.0 1.78 k_s
>>> ZSC ACEL CLMB m+SD 0.0 0.0 33.0 0.0 TTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -i.0 3.0
AC_TYPE 5 SIZE 230.0 200.0 70.0 TEesponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 180.0 1.78 140.0 1.78 k_s
>>> ESC ACZL CLMB m+SD 0.0 0.0 42.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -1.0 3.0
AC TYPE 6 SIZE 230.0 200.0 70.0 Tzesponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 180.0 1.78 140.0 1.78 k_
>>> ESC ACEL CLMB m+SD 0.0 0.0 50.0 0,0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -1.0 3.0
FLEETM_X (1-6) 9,0 5.7 5.3 21.0 43.0 16.0
** * w* ** **** * PROFILE SEG_4ENT **"******************
! Coamen_: Define the bl_nder an_ escap_ pzofilea foe the airczaf_.
AC_CA_Z BLUNDER 1 AC i TYPE 0 RWY L Dstert 62000.0 Tstart m+SD 0.0 0.0
>>> dTURN 3.0 Dblund hi,lo 60761.0 12152.2 BLUND m+SD ANG 30.0 0.0 SLOPE -3.0 0.0 DV 0.0 0._
AC CA_E NORM ESC 1 AC 2 TYPE 0 RWY R Dstart 62000.0 Tstart m+SD 0.0 0.0
>>> BANK--m+SD 22.0 0.0 HEAD 55.0 CLIMB/ACCZL BY TYP_
* * RUNWAY GZOHETRX SEGMENT *********************
! C_alnent: Define runway ge_netry.
RWY PAIR SEP 4300.0 NTZ 2000.0
f. C_nt: Define alarm criteria and _esponse d_ley _iJnes.
ALARM Dalarm 1150.0
************-****** RESPONSE TIME SEGMENT *********************
R_SPONSE SENSOR GAUSSZAN 8 . 9 9.8
RESPONSE ATC GAUSSIAN 0 • 0 0 •0
RESPONSE COM GAUSSZAN 0.0 0 .0
RESPONSE PILOT GAUSSIAN 0 . 0 0 .0
! Co=_0_n_: Define the range of x-offset geometries and the number of runs,
! Ccament: Evader ranges frown 2500 ahead to 3500 fee_ behind blunderer.
STEP_DX DXm/n, max, step -2500.0 3500.0 50.0
RUN X i00 SEED 9876543
Q_IT
Figure 19. Baseline Case Input File for IMC Approach to Parallel Runways
.I t_ I "rsp_.r .ITSn . l'T:_p.:, .:_.n HITSn cure
ID0.0 O.0039 47 0.0039 47
200.0 0_008_ _02 0.0123 149
Figure 20.
hO
O.O
ICO.U
300.0 4O0.0 00100 121
4OO.0 50O.0 0.0107 _30
500.0 600._ _.011¢ _33
600.0 700,0 0.0109 132
700.0 $00.0 0.0131 159
800.0 900.0 0.0154 _86
900.0 1000.0 0.0162 _96
1000.0 1100.0 0.0164 198
1100,0 1200.0 0.0199 241
1200.0 1300.0 0.0202 244
1300.0 1400.0 C.0205 248
1400.0 1500.0 0.0215 260
1500._ 1600.0 0.023_ 2_3
1600.0 1700.0 0.0247 299
1700.0 1800.0 0.0261 316
1800.0 1900.0 0.0296 358
i%00.0 2000.0 0.02?3 330
2000.0 2100.0 0.0296 360
2100.0 2200.0 0.0307 ]72
2200.0 2300.0 0.0350 42_
2300.0 2400.0 0.0332 402
2400.0 2500.0 0.0309 374
2500,0 2600.0 0.03_0 411
2500.0 2?00.0 0_0320 387
2700.0 2800.0 0.0306 _73
2800.0 2900.0 0.0262 317
2900.0 3000.0 0.0249 301
3000.0 3100.0 0.0193 234
3_C0.0 3200.0 0.0196 237
32_.0 3300.0 0.0164 193
3300.0 3400.0 0.0160 218
3400.0 3500.0 0.0140 I?0
3500.0 3600.0 0.0110 133
3600.0 3700.0 0.0101 122
3700.0 3600.0 0.0068 106
3800.0 3900.0 0.0074 89
3900.0 4000.0 0.0082 99
4000.0 4100.0 0.0131 156
4100.0 4200.0 0.0_4_ 176
4200.0 _300.0 0.0190 230
4300.0 4400.0 0.0234 283
4400.0 4500.0 0.0250 302
4500.0 4600.0 0.02_1 340
4600.0 4?00.0 0.0202 245
4700,0 4800.0 0.0161 195
4600.0 4900.0 0.0_35 163
4900.0 5000.0 0.0_08 131
_0198 240
0._29_ 361
0._406 491
0.0520 629
0.0629 761
0.0?60 920
0091_ 1106
0._076 1302
0.1240 1500
0.1439 1741
0.1640 1985
0.1845 2253
0.2060 2493
0.2294 2716
0.2541 3075
0.2802 3391
0.3098 3749
0,3371 4079
0.3869 4439
0.3976 4811
0.4326 5235
0.4658 5637
0.4968 6011
0.5307 6422
0.5827 6809
0.5936 7182
0.6188 749_
0.6446 7800
0.6640 8034
0.6836 8271
0.6893 8468
0.7179 8687
0.7320 8887
0._30 8990
0.7531 9112
0.7618 8218
0.3692 9307
0,7774 9406
0.7904 9564
0.8051 9742
0.8241 9972
0.8475 10285
0.8725 10_57
0.9006 10897
0.9208 11142
0.9369 11337
0.9504 11500
0,9612 11631
Baseline Case Output File for IMC Approach to Parallel Runways
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Figure 2I. Cumulative Probability Distribution Function of the CPA Miss-
Distance
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7.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF IFR SIMULATION
The sensitivity analysis for IMC simulation was determined by separately
conducting a series of runs for each of 14 parameters. Each individual run
consisted of 12,100 trials. In each series the parameters were varied through a
range of values so as to measure the system sensitivity to that parameter. The
histogram data for the probability of miss distance from 0 to 1,000 ft for
incremental values of 14 parameters are listed in Appendix A. The tabular
data are presented graphically in Figures 22-36. The nominal baseline values
in the sensitivity analysis for the parameters were shown in subsection 7.1.
7.2.1 SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL RESPONSE TIME
The total response time is defined as the time that commences with the start
of blunder and ends when the evading aircraft starting to turn (i.e.,
communications time + controller response time + pilot response time +
aircraft response time = total response time). Figure 22 shows the sensitivity
of the probability of unresolved blunders to these times with zero variation,
and for 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 sec. In addition, Figure 22 illustrates that the longer
the time, then the higher the probability of closest miss distance.
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7.2.2 SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL SYSTEM RESPONSETIME UNCERTAINTY
The sensitivity with respect to total system response time uncertainty is
shown in Figure 23. The uncertainties are in the form of variation in
standard deviation (SD). The baseline case has been varied from 0 to 4, 8, 12
and 16 sec. The bars in Figure 23 indicate that the larger the response time
uncertainties the higher the probabilities of closest miss distance.
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7.2.3 SENSITIVITY TO RUNWAY SEPARATION WITH VARIABLE NOZ
WIDTH
The sensitivity of the probability of unresolved blunder with respect to
runway spacing with variable NOZ width is shown in Figure 24. In this case
the NTZ width remains constant at 2,000 ft. The runway spacing for these
runs were at 2,900; 3,600; 4,300; 5,000; and 5,700 ft, respectively. The bars
illustrate that when there is smaller spacing between the parallel runways,
then greater probability of closest miss distance results.
7.2.4 SENSITIVITY TO RUNWAY SEPARATION WITH VARIABLE NTZ
WIDTH
Sensitivity with respect to runway separation with variable NTZ width is
shown in Figure 25. In this case the NOZ width remains constant at 1,150 ft.
The runway spacing for these runs were at 2,900; 3,600; 4,300; 5,000; and 5,700
ft, respectively. Again as seen in Figure 24, when there is smaller spacing
between the parallel runways, then greater probability of closest miss distance
results.
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(NOTE: When comparing Figures 24 and 25 it is observed that the NTZ width
of a constant 2,000 ft has smaller probability of closest miss distance for less
than 4,300 ft parallel runway spacing and a slightly greater probability of
closest miss distance for more than 4,300 ft parallel runway spacing.
Therefore, relative to the collision probability current 2,000-foot width for
NTZ, for runway spacing below 4,300 ft, is the best choice.)
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7.2.5 SENSITIVITY TO LONGITUDINAL OFFSET WHEN BLUNDER OCCURS
The sensitivity with respect to the longitudinal relation between evader and
blunderer is shown in Figure 26. The horizontal axis shows the relation of
evading aircraft with respect to the blunderer (i.e., -10,000 ft indicates that the
evader is 10,000 ft behind the blundering aircraft projected at the approach
centerline of the other runway). The longitudinal relation between the
blunderer and evader has been set at -10,000; -20,000; -1,000; 1,000; 2,000; and
10,000 ft, respectively. As it can be seen in Figure 26, the case with the highest
probability of closest miss distance is the one in which the blunderer is 1,000 ft
ahead of the evader.
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7.2.6 SENSITIVITY TO APPROACH SPEEDS OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT
The sensitivity with respect to variations in approach speeds of the two
aircraft is shown in Figure 27. The horizontal axis shows that the speed of the
two aircraft is at 100, 120, 140, 160 and 180 kn (true air speed), respectively.
Figure 27 indicates that an increasing speed would increase the probability of
the closest miss distance.
7.2.7 SENSITIVITY TO CHANGE IN BANK ANGLE OF EVADER
The sensitivity with respect to changes in the maximum bank angle of evader
is shown in Figure 28. The horizontal axis indicates the bank angle ot: the
evader to be 15, 22, 30, 38 and 45 deg immediately after evading. It can be
inferred from Figure 28 that the greater the allowable bank angle, the smaller
the probability of closest miss distance.
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Figure 27. Sensitivity Analysis - Speed of the Two Aircraft
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7.2.8 SENSITIVITY TO CLIMB RATE OF EVADER
The sensitivity with respect to climb rate of evader aircraft is shown in Figure
29. The horizontal axis scaling shows the variation at 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60
ft/sec, respectively, for the climb rate of the evader. The bars in Figure 29
indicate that a change in the climb rate of the evader does not effect the
probability of the closest miss distance because, in most cases, the turn is only
partially completed at the instant of closest approach. The climb maneuver is
assumed to start only after the turn is complete. If the bank angle is increased
(from 22 deg) or the evasion turn heading angle is decreased (from 55 deg),
then the climb rate will have a minor effect.
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Figure 29. Sensitivity Analysis - Climb Rate of Evader
7.2.9 SENSITIVITY TO TURN RATE OF BLUNDERER
Figure 30 shows the sensitivity to the turn rate of the blundering aircraft. The
horizontal axis scaling shows the changes in turn rate of the blunderer at 1, 2,
3, 4, or 5 deg/sec, respectively. The turn rate of the blunderer appears to have
little effect on probability of closest miss distance.
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72..10 SENSITIVITY TO BLUNDER ANGLE
Sensitivity to the crossing angle of blundering aircraft is shown in Figure 31.
The horizontal scale shows the assumed blunder angle variation at 15, 20, 25,
30, and 35 deg. It can be seen that blunder angle has a strong effect on the
probability of the closest miss distance (i.e., the greater the blunder angle the
greater the risk of unresolved blunder.)
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7.2.11 SENSITIVITY TO SURVEILLANCE AZIMUTH ERROR
The sensitivity with respect to assumed surveillance error is shown in Figure
32. This error has been varied at 0, 3, 6, and 9 mr. Surveillance error changes
do not appear to effect the probability of closest miss distance of unresolved
blunder.
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7.2.12 SENSITIVITY TO EVASION HEADING TURN
The evasion maneuver heading turn sensitivity is shown in Figure 33. The
evader aircraft heading turn is assumed for 30, 45, 60, 75 and 90 deg in this
analysis. Evasion heading turn does not appear to have any effect on the
probability of closest miss distance.
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7.2.13 SENSITIVITY TO BLUNDERING AIRCRAFT DISPLACEMENT FROM
THE CENTERLINE WHEN BLUNDER OCCURS
Figure 34 shows the sensitivity with respect to the displacement of the
blundering aircraft from the approach centerline. The assumed displacement
values are 150, 400, 650, 900 and 1,150 ft, respectively, from the approach
center line of the intended runway that the blundering aircraft is assigned. It
can be observed that the initial displacement from the approach center]ine of
the blunderer has a significant effect on the probability of closest miss
distance.
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7.2.14 SENSITIVITY TO EVADER SPEED INCREASE
The sensitivity with respect to evader speed increase is shown in Figure 35.
The scaling of horizontal axis shows the effect of speed increases at 0, 15, 30, 45
and 60 ft/sec which are caused by the evader maneuvering to escape. The
evader's speed increase does not appear to have any effect on the probability
of closest miss distance. The model assumption is that the evader will not
increase speed until the turn is completed. The analysis indicates that the
point of closest approach occurs before the turn is complete, which explains
the lack of sensitivity to this variable.
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7.2.15 COMPARISON WITH NO EVASION MANUEVER
Figure 36 shows the total response time effect compared with the scenario
where the endangered aircraft does not react to a blunderer. The figure
indicates that when the system response time approaches 20 sec, the evasion
maneuver contributes little or nothing to the safety of the operation.
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7.3 INTER-RELATIONS OF SENSITIVE PARAMETERES OF THE MODEL
The sensitivity analysis for individual parameters of the simulation model
(subsection 7.2) showed that some of the parameters have a strong impact on
the probability of closest miss distance, whereas other parameters had
virtually no effect or minor impact on the probability of the closest miss
distance. Herein the most sensitive parameters are observed more closely
and their variation analyzed with respect to total response time and parallel
runway separation. This is done by varying the parameters, total response
time, and runway separation while maintaining the same risk as the inter-
relations baseline case. The data used in this subsection is in Appendix B.
The inter-relations baseline case is like the previous baseline except that the
nominal alarm distance criteria is 10% of the runway separation for each run
(e.g., the alarm distance criteria would be 4,300 feet for a 4,300-foot runway
separation). This 10% criteria was chosen to make the blunder response more
realistic while preserving simplicity. The probability of an unresolved
blunder (CPA < 500 ft) is about 1.5% for the inter-relations baseline case.
7.3.1 IMPACT OF CHANGE IN AIRCRAFT SPEED
Figure 37 shows the relation of change in speed for both the blunderer and
evader aircraft and how these effect the total response time and runway
spacing.-The horizontal axis shows the response time increments in seconds
while the vertical axis shows the runway separation in feet. The plots and
legend show the different variations in speed.
These plots indicate that change in speed of aircraft direct correlation with the
total delay time and runway separation. Also it indicates that the higher the
6O
speed, the less time that is allowed for the controller and pilot to react in
resolving the blunder. Furthermore, greater runway spacing is required if the
aircraft is flying at higher speeds. The plots also indicate the relation of the
baseline with respect to these changes.
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7.3.2 IMPACT OF CHANGE IN SPEED OF BLUNDERING AIRCRAFT
Figure 38 shows the plots that represent the changes in speed of the
blunderer. The scaling of the horizontal and vertical axis are the same as in
Figure 37. The plot indicates that the relation of the blunderer speed change
with respect to total response time or parallel runway spacing is nonlinear.
The lower speed by the blunderer reduces the risk much faster than the
higher speed by blunderer increases the risk. Also, the figure indicates that
there is less time to take action if the blunderer is flying with faster speed.
The plots show the relation of the baseline with respect to these changes.
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7.3.3 IMPACT OF CHANGE IN BLUNDER ANGLE
Figure 39 shows the relation of change in the crossing angle of the blundering
aircraft and its effects on parallel runway spacing and total response time of
the evading aircraft. The plot shows a slight nonlinear correlation between
blunder angle and other two parameters. Also, it shows that the larger the
blunder-angle the less the response time that is available to the evader in
order to satisfy the miss distance criteria. The plot shows the relation of the
baseline with respect to these changes.
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7.3.4 IMPACT OF ALONG THE TRACK OFFSET DISTANCE
Figure 40 shows the relation of change in the evader aircraft longitudinal
offset distance from the blundering aircraft to the parallel runway spacing and
total response time of the evading aircraft. The correlation is nonlinear, and
the plots show the relation of the nominal baseline case with respect to the
variations. As was seen in sensitivity analysis and is indicated here, the
highest probability of unresolved blunders occurs when the evader is 1,000 ft
behind (on the other runway) the blundering aircraft. The plot indicates that
the more the two aircraft are staggered the greater allowance of the response
time for-the evader to react and the smaller the requirement for parallel
runway spacing compared to the baseline case.
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7.3.5 IMPACT OF DISPLACEMENT FROM RUNWAY CENTERLINE
Figure 41 shows the effect of change in the displacement from the extended
runway centerline of the blundering aircraft on parallel runway spacing and
total response time of evading aircraft. The plots indicate that the greater the
lateral distance of blundering aircraft from its extended centerline before the
blunder maneuver, then the greater the probability of an unresolved blunder.
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7.3.6 IMPACT OF RESPONSE TIME UNCERTAINITY
Figure 42 shows the effect of total response time uncertainty SD on parallel
runway spacing and total response time. The plots indicate that the larger the
total response time uncertainty, the shorter the response time and the greater
parallel runway spacing required for the evading aircraft. This response time
uncertainty can be interpreted as a reflection of the various levels of
controller proficiency and/or aircraft fleetmix.
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Figure 42. Response Time Uncertainty
7.3.7 IMPACT OF EVADING AIRCRAFT BANK ANGLE
Figure 43 shows the effect of maximum bank angle of the evader aircraft on
parallel runway spacing and total response time of evading aircraft. The plot
indicates that the greater the bank angle of the evader, the faster it moves
away from the blundering aircraft. The bank angle of the baseline case is 22
deg. The plot shows the effect of the response time on runway separation.
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8.0 ANALYSIS OF VMC APPROACH TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
The same method used for defining the baseline for instrument approach
during IMC (Section 7) is used here to define the baseline for visual
approaches to parallel runways. As with IMC analysis, the probability of CPA
of two aircraft (i.e., one blundering and one evading) for visual approach was
selected as the guideline for investigating the sensitivity analysis results as
well as evaluating the variation and cross correlation of the simulation
model parameters.
8.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF VISUAL APPROACH TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
Figure 44 shows the baseline case parameters selected to represent the visual
approaches to parallel runways. A brief summary of the parameters and their
values are:
runway separation
alarm distance
NTZ width
TAE mean/SD
response time
response time SD
longitudinal relation
sim blunderer start
nominal speed
blunder at
blunder angle
blunder turn rate
evader bank angle
evader turn heading
evader climb rate
evader speed increase
evader/blunder fleetmix
800 ft
100 ft
1 ft
-1/-1 mr
3 sec
3 sec
-2,500 to 3_500 ft
28,000 ft (from runway threshold)
varies according to aircraft type (refer to input file)
24,304 to 6,076 ft
30 deg
3 deg/sec
45 deg
55 deg
varies according to aircraft type (refer to input file)
0
percent of aircraft fleetmix (6 types of aircraft
class) categorized by speed mean and SD at far/
close distances from runway threshold
Figure 44 shows the inputs and Figure 45 the output of the VMC baseline
case. In the latter figure, data out to a CPA of 5,000 ft is shown. The
probability of an unresolved blunder is almost 8% for the baseline case (i.e.,
CPA < 500 ft). Although the unresolved blunder probability for the VMC
baseline is double that of the IMC case, the underlying blunder probability has
not been factored into the analysis. Therefore it is difficult to draw any
conclusions regarding the relative safety of instrument versus visual parallel
approaches. Figure 46 shows the cumulative probability distribution
functions of the miss distance for respective CPAs.
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>>> ESC ACEL,CLMB m+SD
ACTYPE 2 SIZE 100.0 100.0
>>> ESC ACEL,CLMB m+SD
ACTYPE 3 SIZE I00.0 i00.0
>>> ESC ACEL,CLM_m+SD
AC_TTPE 4 SIZE 230.0 200.0
>>> ESC ACEL.CLMB m+SD
ACTT2E 5 SIZE 230.0 200.0
>>> ESC ACELCLMBm+SD
AC_TYPE 6 SIZE 230.0 200.0
>>> ESC ACELCLMBm+SD
FLEETMIX (I-6) 9.0 5.7
"*"Q""*******""***" AC TTPE SEGMENT *********************
! Careen* : Define aircraft types and fleetmix.
! Ccszaent: MITRE type : ACTYPE correlation (1:1 2:2 3:3 4:- 5:- 6:- 7:4 8:5 9:6)
ACTYPE 1 SIZE 100.0 100.0 50.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 150.0 1.78 I00.0 1.78
0.0 0.0 33.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) meSD -i.0 1.0
50,0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 150.0 1.78 Ii0.0 1.78
0.0 0.0 17.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -1.0 1.0
50.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 150.0 1.78 110.0 1.78
0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -1.0 1.0
70.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SFD 1,2 m+SD 180.0 1.78 140.0 1.78
0.0 0.0 33.0 0.0 FTZ ANGLE(mR) m+SD -I.0 1.0
70.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 180.0 1._8 140.0 1.78
0.0 0.0 42.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -I.0 1.0
70.0 Tresponse 0.0 0.0 SPD 1,2 m+SD 180.0 1.78 140.0 1.78
0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 FTE ANGLE(mR) m+SD -I.0 1.0
5.3 21.0 43.0 16.0
• w**,*******w***,** PROFILE SEGR_NT *w**t*******w****w***
! Casement: Define the bl_er and escape profiles for the aircraft.
AC_CASE BLUNDER 1 AC 1 TYPE 0 RWY 5 Dstar_ 28000.0 Tstart m+SD 0.0 0.0
>>> dTURN 3.0 Dblund hi, lo 6076.1 24304.4 BLUND m÷SD ANG 30.0 0.0 sLOpE -3.0
ACCASE NORM ESC 1 AC 2 TYPE 0 RWY R Dstart 28000.0 Tstart m+SD 0.0 0.0
>>> BANK m+SD 45.0 0.0 HEAD 55.0 CLIMB/ACCEL BY TYPE
• ,,****,, ,w****** RUNMA_ GEO_ETRY SEC_4E_T *********************
! Comment: Define runway geometry.
RWY_PAIR SEP 800.0 NTZ 1.0
! C_m_ent: Define alarm c_iteria and response delay times.
ALARM Delar_n I00.0
• ***.*****,****w.w* RESPONSE TIME SEGI4ENT *********************
RESPONSE SENSOR GAUSSIAN 3.0 3.0
RESPONSE ATC _AUSSZAN 0.0 0.0
RESPONSE COt4 GAUSSIAN 0.0 0.0
RESPONSE P_LOT GAUSSXAN 0.0 0.0
, Q, **_ w,, t RUNX SEGMENT *********************
! C_ent: Define the range of x-offset geometries and the number of r_ns.
! Ccsm_ent: Evader ranges fr_n 2500 ahead to 3500 feet behind blunderer.
STEP DX DXm/n,max, step -2500.0 3500.0 50.0
RUN_X i00 SEED 9876543
QUIT
kts
kts
kts
kts
kts
kts
0,0 DV 0.0 0.0
Figure 44. Baseline Case Input File for Visual Approach to Parallel Runways
LO .I MITSpe: M_TSn HITSper c_ .ITS:,
L00.0 _00,0 0.0_04 _26 0.0_9_ 23_
_0.U 400_0 O.O226 _14 _.0581 _0_
_00.0 5OO.0 0.026q _20 0.0_ I023
6OO.O _00.0 O.04_3 5O0 0._564 IB92
?00.0 800.0 0.0420 505 0.1983 2400
800,0 900.0 0._52_ 1847 0.3510 4247
_0_.0 _00.0 0.0_ 5_ 0_398_ 4824
_000.0 I100.0 0.O3¢9 422 0.4_3_ 5246
1100.0 _200.D 0.0360 435 0.4695 5681
_200.0 _30_.0 0.030B 373 0.5003 6054
_300.0 1400.0 0.0299 36_ 0.5302 6416
1400.0 1500.0 0.0336 40_ C.563e 6822
_500._ 1600.0 0.02_9 350 0.592_ 717_
1600.0 I_00.0 0.02_5 345 0.621_ 7517
I?0_.0 1800.0 0.02%2 353 0.6504 78_0
1800.0 I@00.0 0.02_5 32_ 0.6769 81_I
i_00.0 _000.0 O.O345 417 0._i14 8608
2000.Q 2100.0 0o02_2 353 _.7_06 8961
ZZ00,0 2300.0 0.0279 337 0._9_9 9655
2300.0 2400.0 0.02_7 35_ 0.8276 10014
2400.0 2500.0 0.027_ 335 0.8553 _034_
2500.0 2_00.0 0o02_3 342 _.8836 I0651
2600.0 2_00.0 0.0248 _00 0.9083 ID99_
2700.0 2_00.0 0.0178 2_5 0.9261 11206
2800.0 _00.0 0.0151 163 0.9412 IZ38_
2900.0 3000.0 0.0158 191 _.9570 I_580
3000.0 3100.0 0.0123 14_ 0.96_3 II_2_
3_00.0 3_0_.0 0.01JO _5_ _.9823 11886
3200.0 3_00.0 0.0074 90 0.98_8 119_6
3300.0 3400.0 0.0056 68 0._54 12044
34OO.O 3_00.0 O.OO2? 33 0.9_81%2O7?
3500.0 3600.0 0.0019 23 1.0D0_ _2100
3600.0 _700.0 0.0000 _ 1.00_0 12100
3?00.0 3800.0 0,0000 0 1.0000 121Q0
3500.0 3_00.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
3900.0 4000.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4000.0 4_00.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4100.0 4200.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 _2100
¢200.0 4300.0 0.0000 0 1.00_0 12100
4300.0 4400.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
4400.0 4500.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 _2100
4500.0 4600.0 0.00_0 0 1.0000 12_00
4600.0 4700.0 0.0000 0 I_00_0 _2100
_?00._ 4800.0 0.0000 0 1.00_0 12100
4800.0 4900.0 0.0000 0 1.000D 12100
4900.0 5000.0 0.0000 0 1.0000 12100
Figure 45. Baseline Case Output File for Visual Approach to Parallel Runways
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Figure 46. Cumulative Probability Distribution Function of CPA Miss
Distance
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8.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF VISUAL APPROACH SIMULATION
A number of simulation runs with parameter variation was conducted to
observe the sensitivity of each simulation parameter. Each run consists of
12,100 trials with each case parameter varied separately through the given
values to measure their sensitivity. As previously stated, the probability of
unresolved blunder for a nominal caseof visual approach to parallel runways
is 8%.
The numerical data for sensitivity analysis of visual approach to parallel
runways is presented in Appendix C. The data presented is for the probability
of miss distance for CPA values ranging from 0 to 700 ft. Eleven sensitivity
analyses were performed. Figures 47-58 illustrate the effects on parameter
variation in the probability of miss distance, for the various miss criteria.
8.2.1 SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL RESPONSE TIME
Figure 47 displays sensitivity of the probability of closest miss distance with
respect to total response time (i.e., the time from the evading aircraft pilot
decision to take action to the start of turn of the aircraft). These response
times are for zero variation and for 1 to 6 sec. After 2 sec, the probability of
closest miss distance increases sharply and levels off to a degree thereafter.
O
o
e-
ra
D
o
m
a
e
m
0
m
0
0
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Total Delay (sec)
Figure 47.
[] Pr of 400 ft Miss
BB Pr of 500 ft Miss
[] Pr of 600 ft Miss
[] Pr of 700 ft Miss
Sensitivity Analysis - Total Delay Time
8.2.2 SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME UNCERTAINTY
Figure 48 shows the sensitivity with respect to the total response time (for the
pilot and aircraft) uncertainty. The uncertainties are represented in the
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model in the form of assumed values of the SD (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 sec).
The bars indicate that increasing SD results in some decrease in the
probability for the closest miss distance.
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Figure 48. Sensitivity Analysis - Delay Time Uncertainty
8.2.3 SENSITIVITY TO PARALLEL RUNWAY SPACING
Figure 49 shows the sensitivity with respect to parallel runway spacing.
Runway spacing is evaluated from 700 to 1,200 ft with 100 ft increments. The
closer the parallel runway, the higher the indicated probability of closest miss
distance for unresolved blunders. Note that the alarm distance is 100 ft (i.e.,
100 ft from the extended centerline of the blundering aircraft).
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Figure 49. Sensitivity Analysis - Runway Separation
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8.2.4 SENSITIVITY TO LONGITUDINAL OFFSET WHEN BLUNDER OCCURS
Figure 50 shows the sensitivity of the assumed longitudinal relation between
the evader and blunderer. The horizontal axis shows the relation of evading
aircraft with respect to the blunderer (i.e., 5,000 ft refers to the evader being
5,000 ft behind the blundering aircraft on the localizer beam of the other
runway. The longitudinal relation between the blunderer and evader is
evaluated at -5,000; -2,000; -1,000; 0; 1,000; 2,000; and 5,000 ft. Figure 50
indicates that the highest probability of unresolved blunders occurs when the
blunderer and evader are abreast of each other (i.e., equal distance from the
runways). Note that the highest probability of the closest miss distance for
IFR parallel approaches was at 1,000 ft along the track offset.
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Figure 50. Sensitivity Analysis - Along the Track Offset
8.2.5 SENSITIVITY TO APPROACH SPEEDS OF TWO AIRCRAFT
Figure 51 shows the sensitivity with respect to variation in assumed approach
speeds of the two aircraft. The horizontal axis shows the range of the speed of
the two aircraft at 100, 120, 140, 160, and 180 kn. As indicated in Figure 51,
increasing speed has a small effect in the increase of the probability of closest
miss distance. This inference is unlike that of the IFR parallel runway case in
which tl_e effect was substantial.
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Figure 51. Sensitivity Analysis - Speed of Aircraft
8.2.6 SENSITIVITY TO CHANGE IN BANK ANGLE OF EVADER
Figure 52 shows sensitivity with respect to change in bank angle of the
evading aircraft. The horizontal axis shows the assumed maximum bank
angle of the evader (22, 30, 38, 45, and 52 deg). This figure indicates that the
greater the bank angle, then the smaller the probability of closest miss
distance. This result is similar to the corresponding IFR parallel runway
approach case.
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Figure 52. Sensitivity Analysis - Evader Aircraft Bank Angle
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8.2.7 SENSITIVITY TO TURN RATE OF BLUNDERER
Figure 53 shows the sensitivity of closest miss probability to the turn rate of
the blundering aircraft. The horizontal axis depicts the range of turn rates
evaluated for the blunderer (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 deg/sec). The figure indicates that
an increase in the turn rate of the blunderer, above the baseline of 3 deg/sec,
has a small effect in probability of closest miss distance.
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Figure 53. Sensitivity Analysis - Turn Rate of Blunderer
8.2.8 SENSITIVITY TO BLUNDER ANGLE
Figure 54 shows sensitivity of closest miss probability to the crossing angle of
the blundering aircraft. The assumed blunder angle variations are for 15, 20,
25, 30, and 35 deg. Figure 54 suggests that the blunder angle has a small effect
on the probability of the closest miss distance of two aircraft. These results are
unlike those of the corresponding IFR parallel runway approach case.
8.2.9 SENSITIVITY TO SURVEILLANCE AZIMUTH ERROR
Figure 55 shows the sensitivity of closest miss probability to surveillance
error. Surveillance errors are assumed for 0, 2, 4, and 6 mr. Figure 55
indicates that surveillance error changes have only a small effect on the
probability of closest miss distance. This result is like the corresponding
result for the IFR parallel runway case.
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8.2.10 SENSITIVITY TO EVADER TURN HEADING
Figure 56 shows sensitivity of closest miss probability with respect to the turn
heading of the evading aircraft. The evader aircraft heading turn values
assumed are for 30, 45, 60, 75, and 90 deg. Evasion heading turn does not
appear to have any effect on the probability of closest miss distance, consistent
with the assumed evasion maneuver mechanism.
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Figure 56. Sensitivity Analysis - Evader Turn Heading
8.2.11 SENSITIVITY TO BLUNDERING AIRCRAFT DISPLACEMENT FROM
CENETERLINE WHEN THE BLUNDER OCCURS
Figure 57 shows the sensitivity with respect to the blundering aircraft
displacement from the extended runway centerline. The assumed values due
for displacements of 50, 100, and 150 ft from the extended runway centerline
for the blundering aircraft. Figure 57 indicates that at the initiation of a
blunder, the displacement from the centerline has a significant effect on the
probability of the closest miss distance.
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Figure 57. Sensitivity Analysis - Alarm Distance
8.2.12 SENSrrIVITY TO NO EVASION MANEUVER
Figure 58 shows the sensitivity of closest miss probability to the total response
time (the time interval from onset of the blunder until the endangered
aircraft reacts to the blunderer). The figure indicates that approximately 6 sec
(i.e., pilot and aircraft response times) is the maximum length of reaction
time of the endangered aircraft in order to reduce the miss probability. If the
endangered aircraft does not initiate an evasion maneuver within 6 sec then
the later maneuver has no impact on probability of closest miss distance.
0.2
*o
e-
= • Pr of 400 ft Miss
_=
:E 0.1 Pr of 500 ft Miss
_J Pr of 600 ft Misso Pr of 700 ft Miss
O
"6
I,.
_" 0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 °
Total Delay (sec)
* No Evasion Maneuver
Figure 58. Sensitivity Analysis - Total Delay Time
8.3 INTER-RELATION OF SENSITIVE PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL FOR
VISUAL APPROACHES TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
It was observed in the sensitivity analysis of individual parameters of the
simulation model (subsection 8.2) that some of the parameters have a strong
correlation to the probability of the closest miss distance. In the following
paragraphs the most sensitive of these parameters will be studied in more
detail along with the variations with respect to total time response. These
parameters will be evaluated for their effect on parallel runway spacing for
the 500-foot miss distance and 8% baseline case probability.
8.3.1 IMPACT OF CHANGE IN AIRCRAFT SPEED
Figure 59 shows the relation of the blunderer and evader aircraft change in
speed to runway spacing and total response time. The horizontal axis depicts
the total response time from 0 to 5 seconds, and the vertical axis depicts the
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runway spacing in feet. The legend indicates the assumed variation of the
fleet mix speed. Figure 59 indicates that the change in speed has a linear effect
requiring greater response time for recovery and runway spacing to resolve a
blunder for a higher speed.
1200 "1 --- Aircraft Spd -20 kn
/ ¢" Aircraft Spd -10 kn
1100 1 -- Aircraft Spd Base Line
/ " Airc ft ,1okn
1000 1 -- Aircraft Spd .20 kn //,_
_¢ 800
#=
700 / T T , I I
0 I 2 3 4 5
Response Time (see)
Figure 59. Aircraft Speed
8.3.2 IMPACT OF CHANGE IN BLUNDERING AIRCRAFT SPEED
Figure 60 shows the interrelationship of the blunderer change in speed to
runway spacing and total response time. The horizontal axis depicts the total
response time in seconds and the vertical axis depicts the runway spacing in
feet. The plot shows that the greater the blunderer speed the greater the
probability of unresolved blunder. This relationship is almost linear.
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Figure 60. Blunderer Speed
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8.3.3 IMPACT OF ALARM DISTANCE
Figure 61 shows the relation of the changes in the alarm distance from the
extended runway centerline of the blundering aircraft to parallel runway
spacing and the evading aircraft total response time. The plot shows that the
greater the alarm distance the greater the probability of unresolved blunder.
This relation is almost linear.
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
50 ft Deviation
_8 115000f_ Dev;ia_iton f
l I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5
Reponse Time (see)
Figure 61. Alarm Distance
8.4 COMPARISON OF PBL SIMULATION RESULTS FOR IFR AND VISUAL
APPROACHES TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
Since the parametric sensitivity and analysis of instrument and visual
approach operations to parallel runways were provided in Section 7 thru
subsection 8.3, herein is outlined the major differences between these two
operations as indicated by the PLB simulation results. Those major
differences are:
. Visual operation blunder resolution time is very short due to the short
distance between the two runways with the probability of closest miss
distance growing very fast and leveling off.
. A positive correlation between probability of closest miss distance and
response time uncertainty is indicated for IFR operations, whereas a
negative correlation with less magnitude is indicated for visual approach
operations because of initial assumptions and shorter time.
3. Simultaneous visual approach operations without any along track offset
have the highest probability of closest miss distance because of the short
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spacing between the runways. (For IFR approaches, a staggered operation
of 1,000 fthas the highest probability of closestmiss distance.)
Increasing the speed of the aircraft has a strong effect in the probability of
closest miss distance for instrument approaches, unlike visual approaches
where the short distance between the runways dilutes the effect.
Turn rate of the blunderer has a strong effect in the first two seconds of a
visual approach operation and then levels off similar to that of an IFR
operation.
The steepness of turn of a large blunder angle toward the other runway
has an almost insignificant effect in the probability of closest miss distance
due to the shortness of time required to cross the space between the two
runways for visual approaches.
Instrument approach results are quite different than the visual approach
results where no evasion maneuver is assumed because the IFR operation
tolerates a time delay which is approximately three times longer than the
visual approach and then levels off (i.e., no impact on probability of miss
distance).
78
9.0 APPLICABLE TECHNOLOGIES
This section examines the input of three areas of applicable technologies: 1)
performance of Digital Autoland Systems, 2) TCAS II and the possibility of its
application during parallel runway approaches during IFR operations, and 3)
other feasible technologies (e.g., ESAS, GPSL, etc.); as well as considers the
potential impact that each technology may have on future parallel runway
operations.
9.1 PERFORMANCE OF DIGITAL AUTOLAND SYSTEMS [6]
This is an analysis of localizer track performance data (simulated and actual
autopilot-coupled approaches) associated with a state-of-the-art digital
autoland system (refer to Section 4 regarding Automatic Flight Control
Functions and Control Modes) and its relation to parallel runway approach
operations. The simulation data used here was generated by a BCAG aircraft
Monte Carlo simulation while the actual data was generated from BCAG
flight test tapes. The certification of the autoland system requires precision
tracking of the localizer beam. The FAA requirements for localizer tracking
are found in FAA AC 120-29.
9.1.1 MONTE CARLO DATA ANALYSIS
A Monte Carlo simulation statistical analysis was generated for a
contemporary BCAG aircraft to determine the localizer tracking accuracy. The
BCAG aircraft Monte Carlo simulation model is designed to generate a
realistic autoland environment composed of winds and turbulence, beam
noise and biases, runway characteristics and airplane configuration
variations. For this localizer performance analysis, the simulation was set up
to record the maximum lateral deviation from the runway centerline during
localizer track (when the aircraft is stabilized on the localizer beam). The
localizer intercept angle was varied from -90 to 90 deg (Gaussian distribution).
To filter out the overshoots of the localizer beam, an algorithm was used to
determine when the airplane was stabilized on the localizer beam.
The Cumulative Probability Distribution (CPD) of the maximum deviation
from the centerline during track is shown in Figure 62. The Gaussian
approximation is represented in this figure by the solid line. The simulated
performance can be very closely approximated by the Gaussian line.
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9.1.2 IMPACT OF AUTOPILOT PERFORMANCE ON PARALLEL RUNWAY
OPERATIONS
The Gaussian line is used here to extrapolate the probability of penetrating
the NTZ during an autopilot-coupled approach. The average (MEAN)
maximum centerline deviation during track is 3.2 ft and the standard
deviation (RMS) is 51.8 ft. The distance from the runway centerline to the
NTZ is dependent on the centerline spacing of the parallel runways. For
example, the centerline spacing between runways 36R and 36L at Memphis is
3,400 ft, which places the boundary of the NTZ at 700 ft from the runway
centerline (Figure 63). Thus, the probability of penetrating the NTZ at
Memphis for the simulated autopilot performance is:
P = (700. -3.2)/51.8 = 13.4o
p < < 10-10
Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the NTZ will be penetrated during the
localizer track stage of an autopilot coupled approach. The probability of
penetrating the NTZ for the other airports with closely spaced parallel
runways is shown in Table 7.
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Table 7. Probability of Penetrating the NTZ at Selected Airports
AIRPORT RUh'_IA¥S CEHTERLIHESPACIH6 PROBABILITY OF PENETI_TIH6 HTZ
FT. Lauderdale 27/27L 4,000 feet P = 19.2a < < 10 "1o
Detroit 3L/3C 3,800 feet P = 17.3a << 10 "1°
Raleigh 5R/5L 3,500 feet P = 14.4a << 10 "1°
Phoenix 8R/8L 3,400 feet P = 13.4a < < 10 "1°
Dallas Love 31R/31L 2,975 feet P = 9.3a < < 10 "1°
It is important to note that the maximum lateral deviations recorded for this
analysis were measured with respect to the runway centerline. The Monte
Carlo simulation used to generate this data also includes a localizer offset.
The loca'lizer offset is included in the Monte Carlo simulation to represent a
wide range of ILS facilities. The degree of localizer offset relative to the
runway centerline is defined by the magnitude of the offset at the runway
threshold. The distribution of the localizer offset is assumed Gaussian with a
MEAN of 0 ft and an RMS of 7.3 ft at the runway threshold. The offset at the
threshold can be as much as 16 ft. A 16-foot offset at the threshold translates
to an offset of 75 ft at 8 mi out. This distribution is based on an analysis of
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worldwide CAT II/III runway installations [7]. The maximum lateral
deviation during track was measured relative to the center of the localizer
beam instead of the runway centerline. The resultant landing dispersion
depends on the degree of centerline offset from the localizer as well as
localizer error.
Probable failure and extreme environmental conditions are reflected, whereas
human errors are not reflected. The procedure that the pilot follows for
autopilot coupled approaches to parallel runways is: 1) check the data base of
the FMC prior to engaging the autopilot Approach Mode for the correctness of
the aircraft's assigned runway localizer and glideslope frequencies (pilot tunes
frequencies manually whenever the airport information is not in the FMC
database), and 2) engage the Approach Mode at approximately 150 miles from
the runway, afterwhich the FMC tunes into the localizer and glideslope
frequencies, the localizer capture arms and then engages, and the normal
sequence of events for autoland follows.
9.1.3 FLIGHT TEST DATA ANALYSIS
Flight test data for the aircraft has been provided to demonstrate the localizer
tracking performance. The lateral deviations from the localizer centerline
versus the longitudinal distance from the glideslope transmitter for 18
autopilot-coupled approaches is shown in Figure 64. Using the capture
algorithm described in paragraph 9.1.1, the maximum lateral deviation from
the localizer centerline for these flight test conditions were less than 100 ft.
The simulator data (Monte Carlo) correlates well with the flight test data.
Herein a BCAG aircraft Monte Carlo simulation analysis and flight test data
were used in exhibiting the localizer tracking performance. For closely spaced
parallel runways, there is a NTZ that is 2,000 ft in width between the approach
paths where, for safety reasons, the aircraft are not allowed to enter. The
Monte Carlo simulation analysis has shown that the likelihood that this
BCAG aircraft (when stabilized on the localizer beam) will penetrate the NTZ
during a correctly established autopilot-coupled approach is extremely
improbable (< < 10-1% The flight test data support this conclusion. These
conclusions apply to all the new generation of BCAG aircraft.
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9.2 TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS) [8]
9.2.1 CURRENT TCAS SYSTEM
TCAS is a family of ground independent collision avoidance systems which
protect the host aircraft from potential and predicted aircraft collision threats.
This is accomplished by datalink communication between nearby aircraft
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Figure 64. Localizer Tracking Flight Test Data
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using Mode S transponders. Aircraft equipped with TCAS can also track
nearby aircraft equipped with Mode A and Mode C transponders, but has no
knowledge of aircraft without transponder equipment.
Depending on the TCAS equipment installed (TCAS I, II or III), and the
selected operational mode, the system can issue a Traffic Advisory (TA), and
in the more advanced systems, a Resolution Advisory (RA). The TA
provides a synthetic voice alert and displays the relative position of
potentially threatening aircraft. An RA provides a synthetic voice alert and
displays an advised action (maneuver) or an advised inaction (maneuver
restriction) to avoid a dosing aircraft. TCAS II equipment provides R.As in
the vertical plane only, where as TCAS III will issue RAs in both the vertical
and horizontal planes (TCAS III is currently still in development).
Table 8 shows the type of advisories issued in an aircraft to aircraft encounter
given the equipage of the two aircraft.
Table 8.
No Transponder
Mode A Transponder
Mode C or S Xponder
TCAS Levels of Protection
Own Aircraft Equipment
TCAS I TCAS II
TA
TA&VRA
TA
i
TA
TCAS III
TA
TA&VI-IRA
Target
Aircraft
Equipment
TCAS I
i
TCAS IT
TCAS Ill
TA
TA
i
TA
TA&VRA
TA,VRA&TI'C
TA,VRA&Trc
TA&VHR
TA,VHRA&TI'C
| | |
TA,VHRA&TI'C
TA
VRA
VHRA
TIC
- Traffic Advisory Only
- Vertical Resolution Advisory
- Vertical and Horizontal Resolution Advisory
- TCAS to TCAS Coordination
The effectiveness of TCAS is dependent on the accuracy of the threat aircraft's
reported--altitude and the assumption that the threat will not make an abrupt
maneuver which may invalidate the TCAS resolution. RAs are
automatically inhibited below 500 ft AGL and aural annunciations (both TAs
and RAs) are inhibited below 400 ft AGL.
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TCAS operates to a range of 14 nmi with a density of .3 aircraft per square nmi
including all altitudes. The Mode S system has a selective addressing feature
(each airborne unit is directly addressable) and is capable of datalink
communications. Modes A and C equipped targets only respond to broadcast
interrogations. The TCAS target recognition sequence is therefore different
depending on the targets onboard transponder equipment.
Mode S transponders generate a squitter (i.e., brief transmission containing
self address information) at a rate of once per second. The Mode S unit uses
the squitter to announce its presence to other airborne (and earthbound)
Mode S equipment. The TCAS/Mode S to Mode S target recognition
sequence is:
1. TCAS receives squirter transmission from nearby (Mode S) aircraft.
2. TCAS sends interrogation signal addressed to that specific aircraft.
3. Altitude of the target is encoded in the target response transmission.
4. Timing of the response will determine range and bearing of the target.
9.2.2 CLOSE SPACED PARALLEL APPROACHES WITH TCAS
Generally the current practice is to inhibit RAs (crew switches to TA-ONLY
mode) during parallel runway approaches. This is to minimize false alarms
induced, primarily, during the turn-on to the localizer. Another problem
with TCAS in the terminal area, is the conflict of authority between the
ground based air traffic control and the TCAS advisory generated onboard. In
one of the worst case scenarios (e.g., LAX), parallel pairs of parallel runways
are on separate approach frequencies making the resolution of a control
discrepancy even more difficult.
A modified version of TCAS could have merit in the parallel approach
scenario. The role of TCAS, however, would have to be carefully integrated
into the terminal control environment.
A summation of the results from the blunder simulation could be stated as
follows:
1. The closer the spacing of the parallel runways the less the total reaction
time available (automation, ground controller plus pilot reaction time).
With the minimum visual approach runway centerline separations
currently in practice, the optimal reaction time may be as little as 3 sec. If a
reaction is delayed as much as 6 sec, then an evasive maneuver may be
useless.
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. A predefined evasion maneuver triggered by the violation of the NTZ is
in all likelihood not the best solution. Given the wide range of possible
aircraft pairs and the varied engagement geometries (at the onset of a
blunder event), a pre-programmed evasion may do more harm than good.
Potential TCAS modifications could be incorporated with several levels of
sophistication.
1. A selected TCAS display range that would be optimized for monitoring
the relative position of a parallel approaching aircraft.
2. Modifying the altitude driven TCAS resolution advisory so as to inhibit
limits for a parallel approach mode.
3. An evasion maneuver based on a TCAS type resolution advisory should
yield a lower probability of collision.
. Mode S datalink could be used to transmit the TCAS resolution advisory
to the ground facility, providing nearly simultaneous display to both the
controller and pilot. This would provide the possibility of a coordinated
reaction to the TCAS advisory.
. Mode S datalink could be used to transmit aircraft flight information (e.g.,
position, velocity, altitude, altitude rate, etc.) to the parallel aircraft for
assisting in the monitoring/threat assessment process. The availability of
attitude information could provide an earlier warning of a blunder than
would waiting until the blundering aircraft violates the NTZ (based on
position only).
. The FMC or ground based computer could provide TCAS with expected
threat trajectory and flight performance (database) information for
assisting in the monitoring/threat assessment process.
9.3 ENHANCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SYSTEM (ESAS)
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9.3.1 GENERAL CONCEPT
ESAS is a concept currently in development. The basic system requirements
and objectives have been defined, with efforts continuing on system design.
As currently conceived ESAS is a system which will provide the flight crew
with information about their surroundings that would otherwise be
unavailable due to adverse weather. The system would include sensors,
computers, database information, displays and controls which present visual
images of the environment.
The major sub-systems envisioned for ESAS are:
1. Remote Sensors/Radar (probably with infrared, millimeter-wave and/or
laser radar)
2. Displays (head-up and/or head-down)
3. Digital Terrain (possibly available as part of an electronic library system)
4. Information Integration and Management
Ultimately, the system will allow a flight crew to safely takeoff, land and taxi
autonomously in any weather, including zero visibility, at any airport capable
of operations during clear weather. Approach and landing will be
accomplished without the necessity for ILS/MLS equipped runways. In
addition, the system will provide the ability to avoid hazards such as terrain,
other aircraft, and weather.
ESAS will probably be implemented in stages with the initial design most
likely including one or more of the currently defined capabilities:
, Autonomous approach, landing and departure capability incorporating
terrain awareness in the terminal area, in visibility conditions down to
those normally associated with CAT IliA.
, Visually aided approach, landing and departure capability using Type I
ILS/MLS facilities in visibility conditions down to those normally
associated with CAT UIA.
. VFR type terminal procedures, operations and traffic densities
incorporating terrain awareness in the area under IMC visibility
conditions.
4. Enhanced enroute terrain awareness.
5. Autonomous taxi capability in visibility conditions down to those
normally associated with CAT IIIB.
6. Takeoff and landing performance awareness.
7. Visually aided approach, landing and departure capability using Type II
ILS/MLS facilities in visibility conditions down to those normally
associated with CAT BIB.
8. Enhanced wake vortex awareness.
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Three of the capabilities involve approach, landing and takeoff functions.
One will allow operations on runways with no ILS/MLS system in weather
down to CAT UIA (700-foot Runway Visual Range). Another will allow the
use of a CAT I ILS to land in CAT UIA weather. The third identified capability
may allow the use of a CAT II ILS to land in CAT IUB (as low as 300 ft RVR)
weather.
The traffic separation capability (including lateral and longitudinal separation
from other aircraft) will allow flight crews to operate in the terminal area
using visual flight rules in weather associated with IMC. Functions necessary
to achieve this capability will involve sensing and displaying the area around
the aircraft to a distance of at least 5 nmi which will allow airport traffic flow
to remain at levels close to normal even during low visibility conditions.
The enroute terrain awareness capability involves the display of terrain data
and is needed for route planning and off course descents in case of emergency.
Required functions involve the inclusion of strategic and tactical planning
displays for the avoidance of ground obstacles and an immediate flight path
display using sensed data. Strategic planning involves checking the flight
path entered into the FMC for terrain conflicts. The tactical planning display
functions enable emergency and off route descent terrain clearance. The
immediate flight path display will be used to ensure that the actual flight path
is clear of obstacles. It will also be used to verify terrain alerts and to facilitate
the execution of escape maneuvers.
The taxi capability will allow air crews to taxi in visibility conditions down to
300 ft RVR. The functions include the display of the information provided by
runway and taxiway markings, signs, lights, and color coding schemes. The
pilot must be able to verify that the aircraft is on the assigned taxiway. In
addition, a function will be necessary to detect and avoid obstacles as well as
to detect other aircraft in the immediate area and display them with enough
clarity so that the flight crew can identify and follow them. The benefits of
this capability are tied to the takeoff and landing capabilities since taxiing will
be required in the same visibility conditions.
The predictive wind shear capability deals with detecting and displaying
hazardous weather conditions defined as wind shear and microburst. This
capability must allow the pilot to determine the location and the severity of
either of these hazardous weather conditions within a range of 5 nmi. This
added safety feature will allow the pilot to avoid a potential dangerous
situation.
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9.3.2 CLOSE SPACED PARALLEL APPROACHES AND ESAS
ESAS is not fully defined, but could potentially provide, or assist in
providing, relative position information, threat detection, and alert messages
in the parallel approach scenario. With regard to wake vortices, the capability
to detect and display wake vortices generated by other aircraft is included in
ESAS. The location and severity of detected wake vortices must be able to be
determined and displayed early enough to allow the pilot to avoid them.
This will add a margin of safety presently not available. This capability might
be used to reduce the current 2,500-foot lateral requirement for operations
where wake vortex is involved to a lower value. The monitoring and
alerting capability, using ESAS, could be similar to that provided by a
modified TCAS (subsection 9.2), but with some specific differences. Currently
ESAS is envisioned as an autonomous system using active sensors and an
internal database to enhance the pilots vision, and to some extent allow VFR
type of operations in IFR conditions. The detection of proximity aircraft
would include all aircraft visible to the sensors, and not just those with a
functioning transponder (as with TCAS). However, ESAS would not provide
a resolution advisory or any aircraft-to-aircraft negotiations.
A threat detection function and alert messaging could be provided (by some
onboard unit) using inputs from ESAS sensors, navigational sources, and
library database information. This potential ESAS based system is currently
not as well defined as the potential TCAS based system, but may be easier to
incorporate in the ground based approach control authority structure.
The use of a head-up display (HUD) to represent a potential threat aircraft is
unlikely to be useful given the limited field of view of a hard mounted HUD
system. In the parallel approach scenario the head-down display could
provide a 360 degree relative position representation.
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10.0 CONCLUSIONS
Recommended follow on work:
1. Identifying accurate fleet mix, weather data, and projection of growth for
airports with 2,000 to 3,400 ft. (High Priority)
2. Studying causes of blunder and effect of failures in type of blunder.
(High Priority)
3. Modeling radar error (current and high update rate).
4. Identifying false alarms and their effects.
5. Analyzing turn onto localizer segment approach. (High Priority)
6. Developing an intelligent evader maneuver model.
7. Studying aging aircraft with regard to digital and analog autopilot.
8. Extending the simulation to triple and quadruple runways.
(High Priority)
9. Studying different types of technology for close space multiple parallel
runway approaches. (High Priority)
10. Analyzing real time simulation and actual flight data with regard to pilot,
aircraft and controller response time. (High Priority)
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APPENDIX A
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OUTPUT DATA FOR IMC APPROACH
TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
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This series was run 5/1/93 to check sensitivity to
the absolute speeds of the 2 aircraft. More detailed info is in sens2.comp..stat .
.......................................................................................................................... +
AC speed I00 kts AC speed 120 kts AC speed 140 kts AC speed 160 kts AC speed 180 kts
LO HI HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum
.........................................................................................................................
0 i00
i00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
0.0000 0 0.0008 i0 0.0022 27 0.0044 53 0.0080 97
0.0005 6 0.0025 30 0.0072 87 0.0135 163 0.0210 254
0.0010 12 0.0046 56 0.0114 138 0.0216 261 0.0330 399
0.0017 21 0.0069 83 0.0177 214 0.0328 397 0.0475 575
0.0026 31 0.0102 124 0.0246 298 0.0439 531 0.0650 787
0.0040 48 0.0148 179 0.0341 413 0.0564 683 0.0817 988
0.0059 71 0.0202 245 0.0435 526 0.0707 855 0.0995 1204
0.0170 206 0.0451 546 0.0836 1011 0.1272 1539 0.1650 1996
500 600
600 700
900 I000
This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the bank angle of the evader aircraft. More detailed info is in sens2.comp.7.stat .
+
I bank - 15 deg. bank - 22 deg. bank - 30 deg. bank - 38 deg. bank - 45 deg.
LO HI _ MITS%cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS% cum HITSn cum
.....................................................................................................+ _ ......... _ ....
0 i00 0.0058 70 0.0039 47 0.0032 39 0.0028 34 0.0026 31
100 200 0.0164 198 0.0117 141 0.0094 114 0.0079 95 0.0072 87
200 300 0.0258 312 0.0193 233 0.0150 182 0.0127 154 0.0110 133
300 400 0.0393 475 0.0288 348 0.0231 280 0.0195 236 0.0174 211
400 500 0.0532 644 0.0397 480 0.0320 387 0.0271 328 0.0247 299
500 600 0.0674 815 0.0512 620 0.0411 497 0.0357 432 0.0324 392
600 700 0.0807 977 0.0625 756 0.0520 629 0.0441 534 0.0406 491
900 1000 0.1357 1642 0.1052 1273 0.0879 1064 0.0788 954 0.0731 884
......................................................................................................................
This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the climb rate of the evader aircraft. More detailed info is in sens2.comp.8.stat .
The climb had no effect in this series. This is because in most cases the turn is only partially completed
at the instant of closest approach. The climb maneuver is mechanized so as to start after the turn is complete.
If the bank angle is increased (from 22 deg), or the evasion turn heading angle is decreased (from 55 deg),
the_ the climb rate will have a minor effect. See evade.hilo.comp for runs with a minor climb effect.
climb 20 fps climb 30 fps climb 40 fps climb 50 fps climb 60 fps
LO HI HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%cum HITSn_cum HITS%__cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSncum
......................................................................................................................
0 I00
I00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47
0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141
0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233
0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348
0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480
0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620
0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756
9.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273
500 600
600 700
900 1000
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This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the turn rate of the blundering aircraft. More detailed Info is in sens2.comp.9.stat .
turn I deg/sec turn 2 deg/sec turn 3 deg/sec turn 4 de_/sec turn 5 deg/sec
LO HI HITS%_cum HITSn__um HITS%_cum HITSncum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cuml
.....................................................................................................................
0 i00
I00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
0.0046 56 0.0040 49 0.0039 47 0.0036 44 0.0036 44
0.0101 122 0.0121 146 0.0117 141 0.0116 140 0.0110 133
0.0180 218 0.0194 235 0.0193 233 0.0193 234 0.0193 233
0.0254 307 0.0292 353 0.0288 348 0.0289 350 0.0288 348
0.0337 408 0.0388 470 0.0397 480 0.0402 486 0.0402 487
0.0436 527 0.0524 634 0.0512 620 0.0513 621 0.0514 622
0.0555 671 0.0628 760 0.0625 756 0.0626 758 0.0621 752
0.0955 1155 0.1055 1276 0.1052 1273 0.1046 1266 0.1050 1270
500 600
600 700
900 1000
This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the blunder angle of the blundering AC. More detailed Info is in suns2,coe_.10.stat .
...................................................................................................................... +
blunder engl_ 15deg blunder angle 20deg blunder angle 25deg blunder angle 30deg blunder angle 35degl
LO HI HITS%_cum HITSncum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cumHITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%cum HITSn_cum
.............................................................................................. . .......................
0 100
I00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
0.0000 0 0.0002 3 0.0021 26 0.0039 47 0.005B ?0
0.0000 0 0.0013 16 0.0047 57 0.0117 141 0.0184 223
0.0001 1 0.0031 37 0.0084 102 0.0193 233 0.0284 344
0.0001 1 0.0040 49 0.0135 163 0.0288 348 0.0412 499
0.0002 2 0.0068 82 0.0193 234 0.0397 480 0.0541 655
0.0003 4 0.0084 102 0.0275 333 0.0512 620 0.0692 837
0.0013 16 0.0115 139 0.0350 423 0.0625 756 0.0869 1051
0.0046 56 0.0267 323 0.0660 798 0.1052 1273 0.1436 1737
500 600
600 700
800 1000
This set of ru_s was r_n 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the FTE error uncertainty of both aircraft. More detailed info is in sens2.c_p.ll.stat .
FTE SD - OmP.AD FTE SD - 3_ FTE SD - 6mR_D FTE SD - 9m_RAD
LO HI HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSncum HITS__cumHITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSncum
...................................................................................................
0.0036 44 0.0039 47 0.0045 54 0.0045 54
0.0119 144 0.0117 141 0.0120 145 0.0116 140
0.0201 243 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0196 237
0.0289 350 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0292 353
0.0388 469 0.03%7 480 0.0408 494 0.0402 487
0.0516 624 0.0512 620 0.0511 618 0.0502 607
0.0617 747 0.0625 756 0.0628 760 0.0621 752
0.1043 1262 0.1052 1273 0.1058 1280 0.1041 1260
0 I00
i00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 I000
94
This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the evasion turn heading. More detailed info is in sens2.comp.12.stat .
evasion head 30deg evasion head 45deg evasion head 60deg evasion head 75deg evasion head 90deg{
LO HI HITS%cumHITSncum HITS%cum HITSncum HITS%cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSncum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum
.....................................................................................................................
0 I00
100 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
0.0037 45 0.0038 46 0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47
0.0114 138 0.0114 138 0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141
0.0188 228 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233
0.0283 343 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348
0°0395 478 0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480
0.0510 617 0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620
0.0825 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0_25 756 0.0625 756
0.1055 1277 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273
500 600
600 700
900 1000
This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
distance-from-centerline alarm criteria. More detailed Info is in sens2.comp.13.stat .
alarm-dlst-150ft alarm-dist-400ft alarm-dist-650ft alarm-dlst-900ft alarm-dlst-l150ft
LO HI HITS%cumHITSn_cum HITS%cum HITSncum HITS%_c_m _ITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum
0 i00
i00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
0.0011 13 0.0016 19 0.0024 29 0.0031 38 0.0039 47
0.0028 34 0.0049 59 0.0069 83 0.0094 114 0.0117 141
0.0039 47 0.0073 88 0.0106 128 0.0146 177 0.0193 233
0.0055 67 0.0112 135 0.0167 202 0.0217 263 0.0288 348
0.0080 97 0.0157 190 0.0229 277 0.0307 371 0.0397 480
0.0108 131 0.0215 260 0.0306 370 0.0403 488 0.0512 620
0.0150 181 0.0281 340 0.0387 468 0.0511 618 0.0625 756
0.0293 355 0.0521 630 0.0698 845 0.0875 1059 0.1052 1273
500 600
600 700
900 I000
This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the evaders speed increase. More detailed info is in sens2.comp.12.stat .
The speed increase had no effect in this series. This is because in most cases the turn is only partially completed
at the instant of closest approach. The speed increase is mechanized so a8 to start after the turn is complete.
If the bank angle is increased (from 22 deg), or the evasion turn heading angle is decreased (from 55 deg),
then speed increase will have a minor effect. See evade.hilo.comp for runs with a minor effect from speed increase.
speed change 0fpa speed change 15 fps speed change 30 fps speed change 45 fps speed change 60 fpa
LO HI HITS%_cum HXTSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum H_TS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cUm HXTSn_cum
0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47 0.0039 47
0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141 0.0117 141
0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233 0.0193 233
0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348 0.0288 348
0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480 0.0397 480
0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620 0.0512 620
0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756 0.0625 756
0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273 0.1052 1273
0 i00
100 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 i000
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This set of runs was run 5/1/93 to check sensitivity to
parallel runway separation when NTZ width stays constant at 2000 ft. More detailed info is in sens2.comp.3.stat .
+ ........................................................................................................................
Rwy sep - 2900 ft. Rwy sep - 3600 ft. Rwy sep - 4300 ft. Rwy sep - 5000 ft. Rwy sep - 5700 ft.
l IX) HI HlTS%_cum HITSn cure HITS%__cum HITSn_cum HITS% cure HITSn_cum HITS%_c_um HITSn_cum HITS%_cU_ RITSn_cum
0.0099 120 0.0058 70 0.0039 47 0.0026 31 0.0017 21
0.0226 273 0.0164 199 0.0123 149 0.0086 104 0.0052 63
0.0352 426 0.0282 341 0.0198 240 0.0136 165 0.0088 107
0.0500 605 0.0402 486 0.0298 361 0.0212 256 0.0130 157
0.0679 822 0.0524 634 0.0406 491 0.0277 335 0.0179 216
0.0837 1013 0.0668 808 0.0520 629 0.0362 438 0.0250 302
0.1007 1219 0.0828 1002 0.0629 761 0.0460 556 0.0312 378
0.1630 1972 0.1345 1627 0.1076 1302 0.0813 984 0.0603 730
0 i00
I00 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 1000
This set of runs was run 5/1/93 to check sensitivity to
parallel runway separation when NTZ width varies with runway sepazatlon. More detailed info is in sens2.comp.4.stat .
Rwy sep - 2900 ft. Rwy sep - 3600 ft. Rwy sep - 4300 ft. Rwy aep - 5000 ft. Rwy sep - 5700 ft.
NTZ - 600 NTZ - 1300 NTZ - 2000 NTZ - 2700 NTZ - 3400
IX) HI HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%cum HITSncum HITS%cum HZTSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum
0.0156 189 0.0081 98 0.0039 47 0.0016 19 0.0007 9
0.0336 407 0.0198 240 0o0117 141 0.0054 65 0.0019 23
0.0542 656 0.0356 431 0.0193 233 0.00%8 107 0.0036 44
0.0735 889 0.0504 610 0.0288 348 0.0134 162 0.0055 66
0.0970 1174 0.0666 806 0.0397 480 0.0183 222 0.0074 90
0.1196 1447 0.0840 1016 0.0512 620 0.0240 291 0.0100 121
0.1426 1726 0.1035 1252 0.0625 756 0.0307 371 0.0122 148
0.2287 2767 0.1598 1934 0.1052 1273 0.0574 695 0.0257 311
0 i00
100 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 1000
This set of runs was run 5/1/93 to check sensitivity to
the longitudinal (x) relation betwee_ the evacler and the blundering aircraft. More detailed inEo is in sens2.co_p.5.sta
evader ahead evader ahead evader ahead evader alongside evader behind evader behind evader behin¢
10k ft 2k ft Ik ft ik Zt 2k ft 10k ft
LO HI HITS%cum HITS%_cum HITS%__cum HITS%_cum HITS%_c%_ HITS%_cum HITS%_cum
................................ . ..................................................... .___. .............................
0.0000 0.0008 0.0012 0.0028 0.0186 0.0014 0.0000
0.0002 0.0032 0.0052 0.0078 0.0474 0.0066 0.0000
0.0008 0.0064 0.0082 0.0132 0.0744 0.0126 0.0000
0.0024 0.0074 0.0130 0.0216 0.1032 0.0216 0.0000
0.0042 0.0096 0.0180 0.0310 0.1284 0.0332 0.0000
0.0050 0.0136 0.0224 0.0398 0.1538 0.0478 0.0000
0.0066 0.0192 0.0268 0.0562 0.1776 0.0690 0.0002
0.0120 0.0344 0.0464 0.1290 0.2536 0.1402 0.0018
0 i00
100 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 I000
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This set of runs was run 4/30/93 to check sensitivity to
total system response delay time (with 0 variation). More detailed info is in sens2.comp.l.s£at .
delay-time - 4 sec. delay-time - 8 sec. delay-time - 12 sec. delay-time - 16 sec. delay-time - 20 sec. i
IX) HI HITS% cum HITSn cure HITS% cure HITSn cum HITS% cum HITSn cure HITS% cum HITSn cure HITS% cure HITSn cum
........................................................................................................................
0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0104 126 0.0131 159
0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0003 4 0.0298 360 0.0364 440
0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0026 32 0.0438 530 0.0654 791
0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0147 178 0.0610 738 0.0984 1191
0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0372 450 0.0796 963 0.1287 1557
0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0602 729 0.0993 1201 0.1580 1912
0.0000 0 0.0002 3 0.0818 990 0.1288 1559 0.1859 2249
0.0000 0 0.0256 310 0.1403 1698 0.2364 2860 0.2698 3265
0 I00
100 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 I000
......................................................................................................................... +
This set of runs was r_n 5/1/93 to check sensitivity to
total-system-response-delay-time-uncertainty. More detailed Info is in sena2.comp.2.stat .
delay-time-SD - 0 delay-time-SD--4.O delay-time-SD-8.0 delay-tlme-SD-12 delay-time-SD-16
LO HI HITS%_cum HITSncum HITS%_cumHITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSncum HITS%_cum HITSn_cum HITS%_cum HITSncum
.........................................................................................................................
0.0000 0 0.0007 9 0.0031 37 0.0051 62 0.0060 73
0.0000 0 0.0025 30 0.0094 114 0.0142 172 0.0173 209
0.0000 0 0.005_ 62 0.0154 186 0.0220 266 0.0260 315
0.0000 0 0.0082 99 0.0232 281 0.0327 396 0.0383 463
0.0000 0 0.0135 163 0.0317 384 0.0440 532 0.0494 598
0.0000 0 0.0211 255 0.0437 529 0.0549 664 0.0607 734
0.0002 3 0.0292 353 0.0536 648 0.0652 789 0.0726 879
0.0269 325 0.0686 830 0.0944 1142 0.1074 1299 0.1150 1392
0 100
100 200
200 300
300 400
400 500
500 600
600 700
900 i000
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APPENDIX B
CROSS CORRELATION DATA ANALYSIS OF SENSITIVE
PARAMETERS
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_ard input
blunderer mean speed relative to Evader mean speed, 500 CPA collision rate.
........................................ _ ............................................
spd -20 response.04 response.06 response.08 response.12 response.16
_way.2500 0.0060 0.0120 0.0178 0.0260 0.0302
_way.3000
lway.3400
lway.3700
_way.4000
_way.4300
_way.5000
0.0014
0.0002
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0062
0.0033
0.0019
0.0006
0.0002
0.0000
0.0105
0.0081
0.0064
0.0033
0.0014
0.0006
0.0176
0.0149
0. 0132
0.0099
0.0076
0.0039
0.0231
0.0188
0.0174
0.0138
0.0107
0.0060
Page1
e AC spd response. 04 response. 06 response. 08 response. 12 response. 16
way.2500
way. 3000
way.3400
way.3700
way.4000
way. 4300
way.5000
0.0174
0.0048
0.0023
0.0006
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0403
0.0207
0.0112
0.006_
0.0039
0.0023
0.0002
0.0593
0.0382
0.0267
0.0202
0.01_4
0.0095
0.0037
0.0764
0.0651
0.0533
0.0448
0.0382
0.0318
0.0171
0.0835
0.0754
0.0688
0.0626
0.0576
0.0510
0.0357
spd +20
_ay, 2500
ray. 3000
ray. 3400
_ay. 3700
_ay, 4000
_ay. 4300
ray. 5000
response.04
0.0229
0.0105
0.0060
0.0031
0.0010
0.0004
0.0000
response.06
0.0345
0.0236
0.0163
0.@126
0,0087
0.0074
0.0014
response. 08
0.0417
0.0337
0.0273
0.0219
0.0171
0.0130
0.0079
response.12
0.0486
0.0426
0.0393
0.0366
0,0331
0.0295
0.0200
response. 16
0.0512
0.0457
0.0444
0.0424
0.0409
0.0401
0.0331
_pd -20 J CPA lim J response.04 response.06 J response.08 J response.12 J response.16 J
_ + _
ay.2500
ay.3000
i CPA 400 I
I CPA 500 t
I CPA 600 I
.......... 4
[ CPA 400 ]
I CPA 500 I
J CPA 600
0.0039
0.0060
0.0091
0.0006
0.0014
0.0025
J 0.0085 I 0.0120 J 0.0169 [ 0.0215 ]
[ 0.0120 J 0.0178 t 0.0260 J 0.0302 J
0.0178 I 0.0248 J 0.0329 J 0.0380 i
J 0.0045 ] 0.0079 J 0.0126 I 0.0159
J 0.0062 [ 0.0105 I 0.0176 I 0.0231 I
J 0.0085 J 0.0145 ( 0.0231 [ 0.0310 I
ay.3400
] CPA 400 ]
J CPA 500 i
[ CPA 600 [
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
I CPA 400
Iy.3700 J CPA 500
I CPA 600
I CPA 400
_y.4000 J CPA 500
I CPA 600
I 0.0000
I 0.0000
[ 0.0000
I 0.0000
i 0.0000
I 0.0000
+
J 0.0025 i 0,0060 J 0.0112 i 0.0134 I
J 0.0033 J 0.0081 J 0.0149 J 0.0188 J
I 0.0054 J 0.0114 I 0.0180 i 0.0240 I
÷ F............. + ............. + ............. +
I 0.0012 J 0.0048 J 0.0099 J 0.0134 I
) 0.0019 J 0.0064 l 0.0132 ) 0.0174 I
J 0.0029 I 0.0079 J 0.0149 I 0.0196 J
+ ............. + ............. + ............. _
J 0.0002 I 0.0021 J 0.0083 I 0.0114 I
l 0.0006 J 0.0033 J 0.0099 J 0.0138 J
I 0.0012 I 0.0056 [ 0.0132 I 0.0182 I
I CPA 400 I
_y.4300 J CPA 500 J
I CPA 600 I
........ 4
J CPA 400 J
y.5000 I CPA 500 --J
I CPA 600 I
....... + .......... ÷
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
J 0.0000 J 0.0014 J 0.0070 i 0.0091 J
} 0.0002 l 0.0014 I 0.0076 l 0.0107 J
J 0.0002 J 0.0021 J 0.0097 J 0.0138 J
+ + 4 ÷
J 0.0000 l 0.0000 J 0.0029 J 0.0048 J
J 0.0000 l 0.0006 l 0.0039 l 0.0060 i
l 0.0000 I 0.0008 l 0.0054 i 0.0079 l
+ ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. +
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dard_input
series below is for
sep vs Tresp vs x-offset
Page1
CPA < 500ft, runway separation VS evader along-track relation to blunderer VS total response delay time.
5/12/93, 3990 trials per number.
......................... + .....................................................................................
sponse.04 3000'ahead
0.0065
0.0033
0.0010
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
nway.2500
nway.3000
nway.3400
nway.3700
nway.4000
nway.4300
nway.5000
sponse.06 3000'ahead
2000'ahead
0.0055
0.0013
0.0008
0.0005
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
2000' ahead
1000'ahead
0.0083-
0.0040
0.0013
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1000"ahead
alongside
0.0386
0.0095
0.0035
0.0015
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
alongside
lO00"behind
0.0586
0.0216
0.0078
0.0023
0.0005
0.0003
0.0000
lO00'behind
2000'behind
0.0048
0.0015
0.0005
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
2000'behind
3000'behind
0.0018
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
3000'behind
......................... . ............. . ......................................... + ............................
nway.2500 0.0093 0.0115 0.0170 0.0915 0.1228 0.0113 0.0050
nway.3000 0.0068 0.0065 0.0100 0.0381 0.0752 0.0075 0.0015
nway.3400 0.0048 0.0038 0.0065 0.0185 0.0444 0.0058 0.0003
3way.3700 0.0035 0.0023 0.0055 0.0085 0.0286 0.0045 0.0000
3way.4000 0.0023 0.0018 0.0035 0.0038 0.0163 0.0023 0.0000
_way.4300 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0028 0.0090 0.0020 0.0000
_way.5000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0010 0.0003 0.0000
................................................................................................................
....................................... _ ........................................................................
_ponse.08 3000'ahead 2000'ahead lO00"ahead alongside lO00'behind 2000'behind 3000'behind
.................................................................................................................
nway.2500 0.0113 0.0138 0.0233 0.1263 0.1732 0.0228 0.0078
%way.3000 0.0085 0.0108 0.0165 0.0684 0.1311 0.0165 0.0038
_way.3400 0.0070 0.0080 0.0125 0.0398 0.0942 0.0160 0.0015
%way.3700 0.0063 0.0055 0.0108 0.0258 0.0677 0.0133 0.0010
lway.4000 0.0050 0.0048 0.0080 0.0165 0.0489 0.0110 0.0008
%way.4300 0.0043 0.0033 0.0058 0.0103 0.0346 0.0088 0.0008
%way.5000 0.0020 0.0013 0.0025 0.0040 0.0105 0.0045 0.0000
..................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................
_ponse.12 3000'ahead 2000'ahead lO00'ahead alongside lO00'behind 2000'behind 3000'behind
.................................................................................................................
_way.2500 0.0140 0.0150 0.0291 0.1599 0.2203 0.0341 0.0118
_way.3000 0.0115 0.0145 0.0243 0.1085 0.2080 0.0366 0.0080
_way.3400 0.0103 0.0143 0.0218 0.0749 0.1807 0.0414 0.0055
_way.3700 0.0090 0.0123 0.0185 0.0539 0.1531 0.0406 0.0038
_way.4000 0.0080 0.0105 0.0185 0.0401 0.1278 0.0353 0.0033
_way.4300 0.0075 0.0093 0.0160 0.0291 0.1038 0.0353 0.0035
_way.5000 0.0060 0.0068 0.0118 0.0178 0.0561 0.0293 0.0028
........................................ ............................ _ ...........................................
.................................................................................................................
_ponse.16 3000'ahead 2000'ahead lO00"ahead alongside 1000'behind 2000'behind 3000'behind
......................... + ......................................................................................
_way.2500 0.0153 0.0170 0.0311 0.1797 0.2461 0.0404 0.0138
_way.3000 0.0133 0.0155 0.0281 0.1278 0.2424 0.0456 0.0103
lway.3400 0.0120 0.0158 0.0273 0.0977 0.2288 0.0564 0.0103
_way.3700 0.0115 0.0150 0.0243 0.0762 0.2098 0.0599 0.0083
*way.4000 0.0105 0.0148 0.0236 0.0594 0.1875 0.0637 0.0070
*way.4300 0.0098 0.0138 0.0211 0.0471 0.1622 0.0632 0.0068
_way.5000 0.0078 0.0130 0.0185 0.0303 0.1060 0.0617 0.0060
L
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tis was run 5/17/93.
arm-dist VS rwy separation VS total alarm response time.
Pagel
larmDist I00
unway.2500
unway.3000
unway.3400
unway.3700
unway.4000
unway. 4300
unway.5000
response.04
0.0072
0.0017
0.0004
response.06
larmDi st 200
inway.2500
_nway.3000
_nway.3400
2nway.3700
_nway.4000
2nway. 4300
inway.5000
0.0246
0.0099
0.0039
response.08
0.0390
0.0211
0.0140
response. 12
0.0605
0.0459
0.0322
response.16
0.0663
0.0595
0.0486
response.08
0.0543
0.0306
0.0198
0.0134J
0.0085
0.0050
0.0017
response.04 response.06
........................
0.0128 ] 0.0351
0.0053 0.0161
0.0006 0.0064 _
0.0000 0.0035
0.0000 0.0021
0.0000 0.0010
0.0000 0.0000
response.12
O. 0736
0. 0579
0.0430
0. 0343
O. 0285
0.0233/
O. 0118
response.16
0.0802
0.0707
0.O589
0.0525
0.0467
0.0393
0.0256
.armDist 350
tnway. 2500 *
tnway.3000
Lnway.3400
_nway.3700
:nway.4000
nway.4300
nway.5000
response.04 response.06 response.08 response.12 response.16
0.0174
0.0056
0.0023
0.0006
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0403
0.0240
0.0116
0.0064
0.0035
0.0021
0.0002
0.0593
0.0440
0.0275
0.0194
0.0120
0.0076
0.0025
0.0764
0.0680
0.0539
0.0438
0.0368
0.0291
0.0153
0.0835
0.0793
0.0690
0.0605
0.0552
0.0473
0.0318
armDist 500
nway.2500 *
nway.3000
nway.3400
nway.3700
nway.4000
nway.4300
away.5000
response. 04 response. 06
irmDist 650
0.0174
0.0110
0.0033
0.0017
0.0004
0.0000
0.0000
response.08 response.12
0.0403 0.0593 0.0764
0.0331 0.0527 0.0744
0.0180 0.0341 0.0599
0.0093 0.0246 0.0510
0.0052 0.0165 0.0403
0.0029 0.0105 0.0341
0.0002 0.0037 0.0171
response. 04 response. 06
response.16
0.0835
0.0845
0.0744
0.0678
0.0595
0.0535
0.0357
response. 08 response. 12 response.16
%way.2500 *
_way.3000 *
lway.3400
lway.3700
lway.4000
,way.4300
,way. 5000
0.0110
0.0050
0.0029
0.0010
0.0000
0.0000
0.0331
0.0227
0.0138
0.0074
0.0039
O.0006
0.0527
0.0415
0.0304
0.021_
0 013_ t
0.0045
0.0744 0.0845
0.0655 0.0779
0.0556 0.0711
0.0461 0.0632
0.0399 0.0574
0.0211 0.0388
rmDist 800 response. 04 response. 06 response. 08 response. 12 response. 16
0_0037
0.0017
0.0002
0.0000
0. O190
0.0101
O. 0060
0.0012
0.0341
0.0260
0.0176
0.0064
0.0601
0.0521
0.0428
0.0244
0. 0758
0.0671
0.0612
0.0417
way 2500 *
way 3000 *
way 3400 *
way 3700
_ay 4000
way 4300
way.5000
v
O_C4_t F_GE tS
OF pOOR QUALITY
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The series below is for
total response time uncertainty VS
This was run 5/14/93.
rwy separation VS total response time.
Time SD 33%
runway.2500
runway.3000
runway.3400
runway.3700
runway.4000
runway.4300
runway.5000
response. 04
0.0019
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
response. 06
0 0227
0 0039
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
response.08
0.0519
0.0143
0.0033
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Time SD 67%
runway.2500
runway.3000
runway.3400
runway.3700
runway.4000
runway.4300
runway.5000
response.04
0.0068
0.0004
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
response.06
0.0329
0.0120
0.0039
0.0027
0.0010
0.0000
0.0000
response.08
O.O548
0.0283
0.0163
0.0081
0.0048
0.0023
0.0002
response.12
0.0919
0.0622
0.0411
0.0256
0.0143
0.0062
0.0008
response.16 1
+
0.1118
0.0946
0.0754
0.0585
0.0473
0.0347
0.0107
response.12 response.16
0.0806
0.0649
0.0481
0.0370
0.0302
0.0217
0.0087
0.0946
0.0810
0.0698
0.0607
0.0529
0.0452
0.0252
TimeSD Normal response.04 response.06
runway.2500
runway.3000
runway.3400
runway.3700
runway. 4000
runway. 4300
runway.5000
0.0174
0.0048
0.0023
0.0006
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0403
0.0207
0.0112
0.0066
0.0039
0.0023
0.0002
response.08 response.12 response.16
.............................................
0.0593 0.0764 0.0835
0.0382 0.0651 0.0754
0.0267 0.0533 0.0688
0.0202 0.0448 0.0626
0.0134 0.0382 0.0576
0.0095 0.0318 0.0510
0.0037 0.0171 0.0357
+ ...........................................................................................
+ ................
b Time SD 133%
+ ................
runway.2500
runway.3000
runway.3400
runway.3700
runway.4000
runway.4300
runway.5000
response.04
0.0223
0.0068
0.0033
0.0023
0.0012
0.0002
0.0000
response.06
0.0450
0.0279
0.0186
0.0134
0.0089
0.0056
0.0023
Time SD 167% response.04 response.06
runway.2500
runway.3000
runway.3400
runway.3700
' runway.4000
I runway.4300
I runway.5000
0.0264
0.0130
0.0054
0.0037
0.0023
0.0012
0.0000
0.0496
0.0331
0.0248
0.0198
0.0134
0.0105
0.0050
response.08
0.0601
0.0432
0.0322
0.0252
0.0202
0.0145
0.0074
response.08
0.0610
0.0486
0.0370
0.0324
0.0264
0.0225
0.0122
response.12
0.0742
0.0651
0.0562
0.0508
0.0426
0.0384
0.0273
response.12
0.0729
0.0655
0.O583
0.0537
0.0473
0.0415
0.0320
+ ..........................................................................
response.16
0.0793
0.0748
0.0696
0.0638
0.0597
0.0548
0.0407
response.16
0.0781
0.0729
0.0694
0.0649
0.0607
0.0574
0.0442
Page1
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e series below is for
_der bank angle VS rwy
is was run 5/14/93.
separation VS total alarm response time.
•ade bank 15
inway.2500
_nway.3000
_nway.3400
2nway.3700
mway. 4000
mway.4300
inway. 5000
response. 04 response.06
0.0413
0.0161
0.0056
0.0039
0.0017
0.0002
0.0000
response.08
0.0628
0.0384
0.0242
0.0157
0.0085
0.0050
0.0014
0.0736
0.0552
0.0424
0.0310
0.0244
0.0159
0.0072
response.12
0.0835
0.0744
0.0638
0.0554
0.0490
0.0419
0.0248
response.16
0.0901
0.0831
0.0748
0.0702
0.0638
0.0589
0.0430
,ade bank 22 response.04 response.06 response.08 response.12 response.16
............................ . ...........................................................
tnway.2500
tnway.3000
tnway.3400
_nway.3700
Lnway. 4000
mway.4300
nway.5000
ade bank 30
nway.2500
nway.3000
nway.3400
nway.3700
nway.4000
nway.4300
nway.5000
0.0174
0.0048
0.0023
0.0006
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
+-
response. 04
0.0403
0 0207
0 0112
0 0066
0 0039
0 0023
0 0002
0. 0593
0. 0382
O. 0267
0.0202
o.oi,_,4
0.0095
0.0037
0.0764
0.0651
0.0533
0.0448
0.0382
0.0318
0.0171
0.0835
0.0754
0.0688
0.0626
0.0576
0.0510
0.0357
response.06 response.08 response.12 response.16
0.0721
0.0576
0.0455
0.0372
0.0333
0.0267
0.0143
0.0072 0.0281
0.0021 0.0147
0.0006 0.0060
0.0002 0.0037
0.0000 0.0025
0.0000 0.0014
0.0000 0.0000
..............................
response.04 response.06
0.0789
0.0719
0.0626
0.0581
0.0519
0.0444
0.0320
0.0481
0.0300
0.0202
0.0153
0.0093
0.0062
0.0025
ade bank 45 response.08 response.12 response.16
0,0033 0.0200
0.0008 0.0076
0.0002 0.0037
0.0000 0.0027
0.0000 0.0012
0.0000 0.0004
0.0000 0.0000
...........................................
0.0374
0.0219
0.0157
0.0097
0.0072
0.0043
0.0014
0.0651
0.0519
0.0386
0.0324
0.0267
0.0221
0.0112
0.0767
0.0676
0.0585
0.0541
0.0461
0.0401
0.0285
nway.2500
nway.3000
_way.3400
_way.3700
_way.4000
_way.4300
lway.5000
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APPENDIX C
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OUTPUT DATA FOR VMC APPROACH
TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS
114
This is a series of runs to determine the sensitivity of the s_nulation
to each parameter (taken 1 at a time). Each run has 12100 trials.
The BASELINE is :
runway separation 800 ft
alarm dista:_ce i00 ft
NTZ width 1 ft
TAr mean/SD -I/-I mR
response time 3 sec
response time SD 3 sec
longit (x) relation -2500 to 3500 ft
evader bank angle 45 deg
evader turn heading 55 deg
blunder angle 30 deg
blunder turn rate 3 deg/sec
evader-blunder fleetmix mix %
9.0%
5.7%
5.3%
21.0 %
43.0 %
16.0 %
AC speed n_ean & SD
150.0 & 1.78 / I00.0 & 1.78
150.0 & 1.78 / ii0.0 & 1.78
150.0 & 1.78 / Ii0.0 & 1.78
180.0 & 1.78 / 140.0 & 1.78
180.0 & 1.78 / 140.0 & 1.78
180.0 & 1.78 / 140.0 & 1.78
at far/close dist from rwy threshold
kts
kts
kts
kts
kts
kts
This set of runs was _ 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
total system response delay time (with 0 time variation).
More detailed info is in sens3.comp.l.stat
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. +
I I Tresponse 0 _ Tresponse 1 i Tresponse 2 ] Tresponse 3 _ Tresponse 4 I Tresponse 5 _ Tresponse 6
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. +
] C_A 400 i 0.0000 I 0.0000 i 0.0116 i 0.0653 _ 0.0926 _ 0.1036 J 0.1067 J
I C_A 500 ] 0.0000 I 0.0062 I 0.0705 I 0.1046 I 0.1228 I 0.1312 _ 0.1332 I
I CPA 600 1 0.0053 l 0.0746 I 0.1140 ] 0.1364 [ 0.1499 ] 0.1578 l 0.1612
C_A 700 1 0.0851 i 0.1240 I 0.1487 J 0.1686 _ 0.1783 _ 0.1849 I 0.1882 ]
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + .............. @ ............. + ............. +
This set of runs was run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
total-system-response-delay-tlme-uncertainty.
More detailed info is in sens3.con_9.2.stat .
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. +
i i Tre_.SD 0 i Tresp.SD 1 _ Tresp.SD 2 I Tresp.SD 3 i Tresp.SD 4 i Tresp. SD 5 _ Tresp.SD 6
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. +
i CPA 400 J 0.0653 _ 0.0671 I 0.0602 i 0.0581 i 0.0570 I 0.0562 l 0.0557 i
CPA 500 _ 0.1046 1 0.1035 I 0.0923 i 0.0845 1 0.0789 _ 0.0761 I G.0745
i CPA 600 f 0.1364 i 0.1378 I 0.1272 l 0.1150 f 0.1082 i 0.1037 I 0.0998
I CPA 700 l 0.1686 l 0.1693 I 0.1617 I 0.1564 J 0.1531 t 0.1508 i 0.1488 I
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. +
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This set of runs was run 5/20/93 to check sensitivity to
parallel runway separation when the dist-from-nominal-track alarm =rlteria stays constant at i00 ft.
The data was extracted from ../yse._ir/study.10.co_.stat
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
l I rwy sep 700 I rwy sep 800 I rwy sep 900 I rwy aep I000 I rwy sop ii00 I rwy sep 1200 1
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
I CPA 400 I 0.0661 I 0.0537 I 0.0417 I 0.0302 i 0.0213 I 0.0126 I
I CPA 500 1 0.0924 I 0.0783 _ 0.0657 _ 0.0496 I 0.0364 [ 0.0269 i
CPA 600 I 0.1293 I 0.1081 [ 0.0907 ] 0.0731 [ 0.0581 I 0.0424
] CPA 700 [ 0.1928 ] 0.1463 ] 0.1213 I 0.1002 I 0.0814 I 0.0634 i
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
This set of runs was run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to the
evaders" longitudinal (x) relation to thQ blundering air=raft at the start of the run.
More detailed info is in sens3.co_,5.stat .
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............
I 1 5k ft ahead 1 2k ft ahead I ik ft ahead I alongside } ik ft behind[ 2k ft behindl 5k ft behin
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............
[ CPA 400 _ 0.0104 _ 0.0176 I 0.0096 I 0.3170 l 0.0218 l 0.0098 I 0.0134
I CPA 500 [ 0.0146 I 0.0270 _ 0.0172 ] 0.4054 I 0.0380 I 0.0152 I 0.0194
I C_A 600 1 0.0208 I 0.0372 I 0.0270 I 0.4930 I 0.0660 I 0.0242 I 0.0286
I CPA 700 I 0.0282 I 0.0482 I 0.0456 I 0.5990 l 0.1166 I 0.0338 I 0.0418
+ ......... + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............. + ............
This series was run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
the absolute speeds of the 2 aircraft.
More detailed info is in sens3.comp,6.stat .
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
I I Both i00 kts I Both 120 kts I Both 140 kts I Both 160 kts I Both 180 kts I
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
I CPA 400 1 0.0483 I 0.0624 I 0.0740 I 0.0839 I 0.0921 I
I CPA 500 [ 0.0800 [ 0.0936 _ 0.1084 l 0.1202 [ 0.1278 t
I CPA 600 I 0.1209 I 0.1356 I 0.1472 I 0.1580 l 0.1690 I
I CPA 700 I 0.1770 I 0.1883 _ 0.1982 I 0.2052 I 0.2109 I
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
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This set of runs _as run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
the bank angle of the evader aircraft.
More detailed info is in sens3.comp.7.stat .
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
J I Ev bank 22degl Ev bank 30degJ Ev bank 38degJ Ev bank 45degl Ev bank 52degJ
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
I C_A 400 J 0.0960 I 0.0771 J 0.0650 I 0.0581 J 0.0524 J
J CPA 500 1 0.1243 J 0.1077 I 0.0928 [ 0.0845 I 0.0769 I
J C_A 600 J 0.1545 I 0.1418 J 0.1276 J 0.1150 I 0.1073 I
[ CPA 700 [ 0.1822 [ 0.1732 I 0.1635 I 0.1564 _ 0.1496 I
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. + .............. +
This set of runs was run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
the turn rate of the blundering aircraft.
More detailed info is in sens3.comp.9.stat .
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
I J Blund 1 deg/s J Blund 2 dsg/s J Blund 3 deg/s J Blund 4 deg/s J Blund 5 deg/s J
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
I CPA 400 } 0.0128 ] 0.0396 I 0.0581 I 0.0664 I 0.0713 J
I CPA 500 { 0.0297 J 0.0644 I 0.0845 [ 0.0936 [ 0.0980 I
I CPA 600 1 0.0612 I 0.0953 I 0.1150 I 0.1294 I 0.1365 J
J C_PA 700 J 0.1113 I 0.1400 I 0.1564 I 0.1644 I 0.1693 I
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
This set of runs was run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
the blunder angle of the blundering AC.
More detailed info is in sens3.co_.10.stat .
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
_ Blunder 15deg J Blunder 20deg J Blunder 25deg ] Blunder 30deg ] Blunder 35deg ]
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
J CPA 400 1 0.0255 J 0.0417 J 0.0534 I 0.0581 I 0.0591 I
I CPA 500 J 0.0504 I 0.0698 I 0.0802 I 0.0845 J 0.0871 I
I C_A 600 1 0.0864 I 0.1045 I 0.1115 I 0.1150 I 0.1176 J
I CPA 700 1 0.1316 I 0.1461 I 0.1530 I 0.1564 I 0.1589 I
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
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This set of runs was run 5/4/93 to check sensitivity to
the TAE error uncertainty of both aircraft.
More detailed info is in sens3.comp.ll.stat .
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
I I TAE.SD 0 mRad I TAE.SD 2 mRad I TAE.SD 4 mRad I TAE.SD 6 mRad
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
I CPA 400 I 0.0579 i 0.0571 I 0.0531 ( 0.0519 I
I CPA 500 1 0.0848 I 0.0831 I 0.0760 I 0.0762 I
I CPA 600 1 0.1150 I 0.1142 I 0.1076 I 0.1106 I
I CPA 700 1 0.1556 I 0.1555 I 0.1549 I 0.1550 I
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
This set of runs was run 5/28/93 to check sensitivity to
the evasion turn heading.
More detailed info is in sens3.co_p.12.stat .
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
I I Ev turn 30deg I Ev tur_ 45deg I EV turn 60deg I Ev turn 75deg J Ev turn 90dog l
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
I CPA 400 1 0.1050 I 0.1060 I 0.1060 I 0.1060 I 0.1060 I
I CPA 500 ] 0.1355 I 0.1362 I 0.1364 I 0.1364 I 0.1364 I
I CPA 600 1 0.1645 I 0.1661 I 0.1663 I 0.1663 I 0.1663 I
I CPA 700 ( _.1947 I 0.1963 I 0.1964 I 0.1964 I 0.1964
+ ......... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... + ............... +
This set of runs was run 5120/93 to check sensitivity to
the distance-from-centerline alarm criteria.
The data was extracted from ../yse.dir/study.10.comp.stat
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. +
I I Dalarm 50 I Dalarm i00 I Dalarm 150 [
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. +
I CPA 400 i 0.0374 I 0.0537 I 0.0649 I
I CPA 500 1 0.0581 I 0.0783 I 0.0921 I
I CPA 600 1 0.0806 I 0.1081 I 0.1264 I
I CPA 700 1 0.1159 l 0.1463 I 0.1603 I
+ ......... + .............. + .............. + .............. +
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